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OUT OF THIN AIR: USING FIRST AMENDMENT  
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS TO REDEEM 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING REGULATION 
Anthony E. Varona* 
American television and radio broadcasters are uniquely privileged among Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) licensees. Exalted as public trustees by the 
1934 Communications Act, broadcasters pay virtually nothing for the use of their 
channels of public radiofrequency spectrum, unlike many other FCC licensees who 
have paid billions of dollars for similar digital spectrum. Congress envisioned a 
social contract of sorts between broadcast licensees and the communities they 
served. In exchange for their free licenses, broadcast stations were charged with 
providing a platform for a “free marketplace of ideas” that would cultivate a de-
mocratically engaged and enlightened citizenry through the broadcasting of 
“public interest” programming.  
 
Few, other than the broadcasters themselves, would dispute that this “public trus-
tee” doctrine has been a dismal failure. In exchange for the tens of billions of 
dollars of advertising revenue generated by their licenses, commercial television 
and radio broadcasters air very little—and some air none—of the kinds of locally 
oriented public affairs, political, educational, and cultural programming tradi-
tionally considered “public interest” fare. Congress and the FCC have failed to 
correct the mismatch between the proven profit-making power of public trusteeship 
and its anemic returns for the American people. To the contrary, Congress and the 
FCC, captured by the broadcast industry they regulate, have continued to subsidize 
commercial broadcasters constructively by awarding them new lucrative digital 
channels at no cost to them, while lifting ownership concentration limits and 
eliminating or failing to enforce the few remaining public interest programming 
requirements.  
 
This Article begins by surveying the history of the public trustee doctrine, its First 
Amendment contradictions, and the legislative and regulatory failures and frus-
trations that have bedeviled the pursuit of a “free marketplace of ideas” on the 
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nation’s airwaves. It then explores the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine as 
an alternative justification for government regulation of the public spectrum, rea-
soning in favor of the government’s proactive creation and maintenance of public 
speech fora. After examining the Internet both as a public forum and as the sort of 
“free marketplace of ideas” that the broadcast spectrum was expected—but failed—
to create, this Article argues that an affirmative public forum doctrine supports a 
requirement that broadcasters subsidize broadband Internet access in low-income 
and underserved communities. 
I. Introduction 
The history of American broadcast regulation is riddled with 
broken promises and unfulfilled aspirations. Congress and early 
communications regulators greeted the birth of broadcasting1 in 
the early twentieth century as the advent of a new era in civic par-
ticipation, with broadcast stations serving as platforms for a 
ubiquitous and universally accessible “free marketplace of ideas” 
that would cultivate a more deliberative democracy, and an enlight-
ened, educated and engaged citizenry.2 Like the Internet today, the 
nascent broadcasting medium was regarded as a vast and fertile 
public forum with great potential as a democratic resource. Her-
bert Hoover, then serving as Secretary of Commerce, articulated 
these aspirations when he declared in 1925 that “[t]he ether is a 
public medium, and its use must be for a public benefit.”3  
                                                   
1. The focus of this Article is on commercial broadcasting. Public, non-commercial 
television and radio stations are subject to specialized federal regulations and different 
structural requirements prescribed by various federal statutes, most importantly the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2000). 
2. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 384–86 (1969); see also Advisory Comm. on Pub. 
Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Charting the Digital 
Broadcasting Future 21 (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/ 
piacreport.pdf. The Advisory Committee was empanelled by President William J. Clinton to 
examine whether television broadcasters transmitting over new lucrative digital television 
(DTV) channels should be required to meet certain quantified public interest obligations in 
exchange for their free use of the frequencies. Id. at 1. In its Final Report, it characterized 
the purpose of broadcast regulation in the following way: 
From the beginning, broadcast regulation in the public interest has sought to meet 
certain basic needs of American politics and culture, over and above what the mar-
ketplace may or may not provide. It has sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, 
greater democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, 
and more robust, culturally inclusive communities. 
Id. at 21. 
3. Gov’t Printing Office, Dep’t of Commerce, Proceedings of the Fourth Na-
tional Radio Conference and Recommendations for Regulation of Radio 7 (1926), 
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Congress laid the foundations for what soon became known as 
the broadcast public trustee doctrine in the Radio Act of 19274 and 
its successor, the Communications Act of 1934.5 The legislation 
prescribed a social contract of sorts between broadcast licensees 
and the American public. In exchange for the free and exclusive 
right to exploit their licensed channels of the public radiofre-
quency spectrum, broadcasters were required to air programming 
that served the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”6 Con-
gress left it to the regulators to define what this “public interest 
standard” entailed as the industry evolved. 
The Federal Radio Commission, the provisional agency later re-
placed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
interpreted the public trustee doctrine as requiring that broadcast 
stations “be operated as if owned by the public. . . . [A]s if people 
of a community should own a station and turn it over to the best 
man in sight with this injunction: Manage this station in our inter-
est.”7  
Although the FCC continues to claim that the broadcast regula-
tory regime promotes “the public’s First Amendment interest in a 
robust marketplace of ideas,”8 the government’s lofty aspirations 
for broadcasting have proven unattainable. The FCC has failed to 
articulate a coherent and durable definition of “public interest” 
broadcasting and impose concordant programming requirements 
commensurate with the true value of broadcast licenses, which now 
generate upwards of $24 billion of annual broadcast advertising 
                                                   
available at http://earlyradiohistory.us/1925conf.htm. Secretary (and later President) Hoo-
ver stated that “[t]he dominant element for consideration in the radio field is, and always 
will be, the great body of the listening public, millions in number, country-wide in distribu-
tion.” Id. 
4. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 51, 44 Stat. 1552. 
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613 (2000)).  
6. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). Congress has lengthened the term of broadcast licenses 
through the years. The 1934 Communications Act prescribed a three-year term for broad-
cast licensees. 48 Stat. at 1084. In 1981, Congress extended the television license term to five 
years and the radio license term to seven years. Public Broadcasting Amendment Act of 
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241(a), 95 Stat. 358, 736. In 1996 Congress extended the license 
terms once again to eight years for both television and radio stations. Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 203, 110 Stat. 56, 112. 
7. The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, 
11 J. Fed. Comm. B. Ass’n 5, 14 (1950).  
8. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broad. Own-
ership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,688 (2003); see also In re Reallocation & Service Rules for the 
698–746 MHz Spectrum Band, 17 F.C.C.R. 1022, 1124 (2002) (statement of Comm’r Mi-
chael J. Copps) (touting free commercial broadcasting as having a “special and critical role 
in our communities and in the nation’s marketplace of ideas”). 
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revenue alone for local television stations.9 The FCC traditionally 
has considered locally oriented public affairs, political, educa-
tional, and cultural programming as satisfying the public interest 
standard, but its failure to require minimum quantities of such 
programming has resulted in its scarcity on the broadcast spec-
trum. Most broadcasters today air very little of this sort of public 
interest programming, and some air none of it at all.10 Neverthe-
less, Congress and the FCC continue to confer onto broadcasters 
all of the privileges of public trusteeship, including, most recently, 
the assignment of a new, lucrative digital television channel at no 
cost to them.11 By contrast, other FCC licensees, including landline 
and wireless telecommunications providers, paid in excess of $23 
billion for certain digital licenses in spectrum auctions conducted 
over a four-year period in the 1990s.12 
The failure of the public trusteeship model in broadcasting 
regulation is not the result of judicial hostility. To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld the public trustee doctrine 
and its attendant regulation of broadcast speech against constitu-
tional challenge. In 1969, the Supreme Court in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC declared that in light of the public owner-
ship of the airwaves, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”13 The Court 
reasoned that because “there are substantially more individuals 
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate,”14 this 
scarcity permits the government “to put restraints on licensees” in 
                                                   
9. The 2003 revenue from television broadcast properties alone—stations and net-
works—totaled $18.8 billion for the largest three television networks, with the General 
Electric Company (NBC) earning $6.2 billion, Walt Disney Company (ABC) earning $4.8 
billion, and Viacom (CBS) earning $7.8 billion. The Project for Excellence in Journal-
ism, The State of the News Media 2005: An Annual Report on American Journalism: 
Network TV (2005), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/printable_networktv_ 
ownership.asp. Total 2003 advertising revenue for local television stations topped $24 bil-
lion. The Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 2005: 
An Annual Report on American Journalism: Local TV (2005), http://www. 
stateofthemedia.org/2005/printable_localtv_economics.asp. 
10. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
12. See In re Report to Cong. on Spectrum Auctions, 13 F.C.C.R. 9601, 9603 tbl.1 
(1997) (reporting revenue from spectrum auctions totaling $23 billion); see also Lessons from 
the United States Spectrum Auctions Before the S. Budget Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared 
testimony of Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~budget/republican/about/hearing2000/cramton.htm (noting 
that two spectrum auctions in the mid-1990s yielded over $20 billion in revenue). 
13. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
14. Id. at 388. 
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order to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail.”15  
The Supreme Court and Congress have continued to uphold 
this “scarcity rationale” despite persistent criticism from scholars 
and the broadcasters themselves. Some commentators have argued 
that the scarcity rationale was illogical at its inception because all 
media resources, including newsprint, are scarce.16 Conflating the 
scarcity of content sources with the scarcity of awardable broadcast 
licenses, which was the Court’s focus, they also argue that the scar-
city rationale is obsolete now in the era of 500-channel subscription 
television, the Internet, and more efficient spectrum management. 
Few of these critics acknowledge that while many Americans can 
afford to access the diversity of content that pay television, Internet 
subscriptions, and other new media provide, many cannot. For a 
still-significant number of Americans, free over-the-air television is 
the only conduit to regular news, political information, cultural en-
richment, education, and democratic engagement. This disparity 
in access makes it impossible to have a truly representative and 
functioning American marketplace of ideas.17 In addition, although 
technological advances in digital spectrum management have 
made it feasible to accommodate more “channels” on broadcast 
frequencies,18 the fact remains that demand for broadcast licenses 
far outstrips their supply.19  
As a continuation of my analysis in Changing Channels and Bridg-
ing Divides: The Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television 
Regulation (hereinafter Changing Channels),20 this Article examines 
the persistent legislative and regulatory failures and First Amend-
ment frustrations that have bedeviled the pursuit of the “free 
                                                   
15. Id. at 390; see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A licensed broad-
caster is ‘granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public 
domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.’ ” 
(quoting Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966))). 
16. See, e.g., infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
17. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe warns, “[w]hen the wealthy have more access to 
the most potent media of communication than the poor, how sure can we be that ‘free trade 
in ideas’ is likely to generate truth?” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
786 (2d ed. 1988). 
18. See David Weinberger, The Myth of Interference, Salon.com, Mar. 12, 2003, 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/12/spectrum/ (discussing how the transi-
tion to digital broadcasting presents significant opportunities to accommodate more 
channels on broadcast spectrum); see also Drew Clark, Spectrum Wars, Nat’l J., Feb. 19, 2005, 
http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/0218njsp.htm. 
19. See infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
20. Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and Redemp-
tion of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 1 (2004).  
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marketplace of ideas” on the public airwaves. Part II begins with a 
brief historical overview of the public trustee doctrine, and pro-
ceeds to examine the constitutional, economic, structural, and 
political contradictions that contribute to the persistent failure of 
the broadcast regulatory regime. Part III shifts the focus towards an 
underanalyzed and underutilized First Amendment justification 
for government regulation of the public spectrum: the First 
Amendment’s public forum doctrine, which not only protects ex-
pression in public spaces, but also argues in favor of the 
government’s creation and maintenance of public speech fora. It 
begins with an overview of public forum law, and proceeds into an 
analysis of whether the broadcast spectrum indeed qualifies as a 
public forum. The Part continues with an examination of the 
Internet both as a public forum—or, more accurately, an amalga-
mation of countless public and private fora—and as the sort of 
“free marketplace of ideas” that the broadcast spectrum was ex-
pected but failed to create. I conclude with an analysis of how 
development of an affirmative public forum doctrine would lend 
support to a requirement that broadcasters subsidize broadband 
Internet access in low-income and other underserved communi-
ties. 
II. The Dysfunction of American Broadcasting Regulation 
A. The Foundations and History of the Broadcast  
Public Trustee Doctrine 
By the middle of the 1920s, radio had evolved from a cultural 
novelty to a maritime and military communications tool, and a 
burgeoning commercial medium capable of becoming a ubiqui-
tous presence in the lives of most Americans.21 Responding to calls 
                                                   
21. The earliest regulatory interventions into the nascent technology of radio broad-
casting in the first two decades of the twentieth century were limited to coordinating the use 
of specific frequencies between maritime and military users, and experimentation in the 
technology by individuals and private concerns intrigued by the capabilities of the new me-
dium. See Marvin Bensman, The Beginning of Broadcast Regulation in the 
Twentieth Century 4–6, 11–14 (2000); see also Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: 
Political Origins of Modern Communications 224–25 (2004). With the reach of each 
broadcaster’s signal limited by modest transmitter power, signal interference was not of 
paramount concern in the early years of broadcasting. Id. at 348–49. After World War I 
demonstrated the remarkable value of radio in tactical operations and news dissemination, 
the number of broadcasting stations exploded, with almost 600 licensed radio stations oper-
ating in 1925. See Varona, supra note 20, at 11–12. The years 1921 and 1922 saw an especially 
dramatic increase in the number of stations, with a rise from 23 licensed stations as of  
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for regulation of the proliferating broadcasters, Congress enacted 
the 1927 Radio Act, which created the provisional Federal Radio 
Commission (FRC) and vested it with limited authority to issue ra-
dio licenses pursuant to the “public interest, convenience or 
necessity”—terms that Congress left undefined.22 In a 1930 broad-
cast licensing decision, the FRC interpreted broadcasters’ public 
interest obligation as “requir[ing] ample play for the free and fair 
competition of opposing views[,]”23 a requirement that “applies . . . 
to all discussions of issues of importance to the public.”24 
Seven years after the FRC’s creation, Congress passed the Com-
munications Act of 1934 and delegated broad25 regulatory power to 
the FCC, the FRC’s permanent replacement.26 The Communica-
tions Act, like the 1927 Radio Act, required that broadcasting be 
regulated in furtherance of the “public convenience, interest, or 
necessity,”27 terms that the Supreme Court later acknowledged 
“were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission’s own 
devising . . . .”28 Armed with this authority, the FCC set about to 
implement and enforce public trusteeship of the nation’s airwaves. 
The FCC’s repeated attempts over the last seven decades at elu-
cidating and enforcing the public trustee doctrine have failed to 
produce a comprehensive set of durable and substantive pro-
gramming requirements. In 1940, the young FCC announced that 
the public interest standard required broadcasters to be “sensitive 
to the problems of public concerns in the community and to make 
sufficient time available, on a non-discriminatory basis, for the full 
                                                   
December 1, 1921 to 570 licensed stations on December 1, 1922. Bensman, supra, at 30. The 
growth of broadcasting was so fast and so dramatic that the Supreme Court later noted: 
“With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190, 212 (1943). 
22. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 9, 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166–67. 
23. In re Application of Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm’n., 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930). 
24. Id. 
25. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (“[Congress’s] mandate 
to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power 
‘not niggardly but expansive . . . .’ ” (quoting Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 
219 (1943))). 
26. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613 (2000)).  
27. Id. § 307(b), 48 Stat. at 1084. Congress used the phrases “public convenience, in-
terest, or necessity” and “public interest, convenience, or necessity” interchangeably in the 
1934 Communications Act. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (using the former term); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 303 (using the latter term). Both iterations of the phrase have become known as the “pub-
lic interest” standard. 
28. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 
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discussion thereof.”29 Not surprisingly, this vague measure of 
broadcaster compliance with the obligations of public trusteeship 
led to widespread criticism of the FCC for not expecting enough in 
return from broadcasters for the value of their licenses.30 That 
criticism spurred the FCC to issue in 1946 its “Public Service Re-
sponsibility of Broadcast Licensees.” The infamous “Blue Book” 
marked the FCC’s first attempt at articulating a comprehensive list 
of public interest programming obligations.31 It instructed broad-
casters to air a “reasonable” quantity of programming not 
supported by commercial advertising, but underwritten by broad-
casters themselves to cover issues of local importance.32 It also 
identified discrete categories of programming—including “discus-
sion,” “talks,” and “education”—that it expected all broadcasters to 
air on penalty of license non-renewal, and it adopted a new license 
renewal form that reflected the new requirements.33  
The Blue Book bombed. Immediately upon its release, the al-
ready powerful broadcast lobby attacked it as a violation of the First 
Amendment rights of broadcast licensees to determine their own 
programming content.34 The FCC capitulated and almost never 
referred to the Blue Book in subsequent orders and decisions, 
largely ignoring the matter of station compliance with the public 
interest programming standards when evaluating license renewal 
applications. In fact, its enforcement of the public interest stan-
dard became so lax that in 1950 it renewed the license of a station, 
WOAX, which explicitly refused to air any programming qualifying 
as “public interest” fare.35  
After several high-profile scandals involving rigged television 
game shows and the use of “payola” to bribe radio personalities to 
promote certain recordings36 brought negative attention to the lack 
                                                   
29. In re The Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 333, 340 (1940). One year later, the 
FCC indicated that broadcast licensees had “a recognized duty to present well-rounded pro-
grams on subjects which may be fairly said to constitute public controversies of the day 
within the framework of our democratic system of government.” In re Metro. Broad. Corp. 
(WMBQ), 8 F.C.C. 557, 577 (1941). 
30. See Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC’s Weak Track 
Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 1057, 1061–62 (1982). 
31. See FCC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946) (nick-
named the “Blue Book” because of its blue cover). 
32. Id. at 12–39, 40–47. 
33. See Chamberlin, supra note 30, at 1062–63, 1063 n.24. 
34. Id. at 1063 n.25. 
35. In re Revocation of License of Station WTNJ, 6 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1101, 1101–03 
(1950). 
36. See In re Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.2d 2303, 2303–05 (1960); see also 
Hearings on Television Quiz Game Shows Before a Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. (1959). 
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of regulatory oversight of commercial broadcasters, the FCC at-
tempted for a second time to implement comprehensive public 
interest programming requirements by means of the “1960 Pro-
gramming Statement.”37 This time, the FCC acknowledged that 
although the First Amendment prohibited the FCC from dictating 
broadcast programming selection, the broadcasters themselves 
were bound by the 1934 Communications Act and their status as 
public trustees to air programming meeting the “public interest, 
needs and desires of the communit[ies]” in which they were li-
censed.38 The FCC characterized such programming as fitting 
within a non-exclusive list of fourteen categories, which included 
“opportunity for local self-expression,” “public affairs programs,” 
“political broadcasts,” “educational programs,” and “service to mi-
nority groups.”39 In a speech to the National Association of 
Broadcasters, then-FCC Chairman Newton N. Minow accused 
broadcasters of neglecting their public trustee duties and allowing 
the fertile broadcast spectrum to become a “vast wasteland” of pro-
gramming that did little to cultivate democracy.40 He warned: 
“Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries is over-
due. Never have so few owed so much to so many.”41 
Despite Chairman Minow’s bluster, the 1960 Programming 
Statement, like the “Blue Book,” proved ineffective. The FCC 
rarely referred to it in assessing broadcasters’ license renewal ap-
plications and proceeded to routinely grant license renewal 
applications in very large batches, with little or no scrutiny of the 
public interest performance of the individual applicants,42 despite 
                                                   
37. Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.R.2d 2303 (1960).  
38. Id. at 2314. 
39. Id. The other nine categories were “the development and use of local talent,” 
“programs for children,” “religious programs,” “editorialization by licensees,” “agricultural 
programs,” “news programs,” “weather and market reports,” “sports programs,” and “enter-
tainment programs.” Id. The 1960 Programming Statement also instructed broadcast 
licensees to investigate the particular public interest programming needs of their local 
communities. Id. That requirement resulted in the promulgation of the “ascertainment” 
rules, which laid out detailed requirements on how licensees would document their efforts 
in determining and satisfying the particular viewing needs and tastes of their communities 
of license. See In re Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, 27 
F.C.C.2d 650, 656–58 (1971).  
40. Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 
1961), in Newton N. Minow & Craig L. Lamay, Abandoned in the Wasteland: Chil-
dren, Television and the First Amendment, 188 app. 2 (1995). 
41. Id. at 189. 
42. See, e.g., In re Renewals of Broad. Licenses for Ind., Ky., & Tenn., 42 F.C.C.2d 900, 
900 (1973) (approving license renewal applications of 374 stations). For more examples of 
en masse approvals, see Varona, supra note 20, at 25 n.98. 
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multiple instances where broadcast licensees would air no public 
interest programming whatsoever.43  
The FCC’s continued attempts to interpret and enforce the pub-
lic trustee doctrine by means of new, tangible requirements ceased 
in the early 1980s with the advent of the Reagan Administration’s 
efforts to effect sweeping federal deregulation. President Reagan’s 
FCC Chairman, Mark Fowler, articulated the deregulatory animus 
best by quipping that “television is just another appliance, it’s a 
toaster with pictures.”44 Chairman Fowler charged that the FCC 
had no authority to prescribe any particular programming, “public 
interest” or otherwise,45 given the First Amendment and § 326 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits the FCC from 
censoring broadcast content.46 Chairman Fowler proclaimed that 
“we are at the end of regulating broadcasting under the trusteeship 
model.”47 In its place, Fowler advocated what he called a “market-
place approach” to broadcast regulation. No doubt inspired by the 
Chicago School’s exaltation of private markets as arbiters of the 
true public interest,48 Fowler mandated that “the Commission 
should, so far as possible, defer to a broadcaster’s judgment about 
how best to compete for viewers and listeners because this serves 
the public interest.”49 
The sweeping deregulatory efforts at the FCC led to the elimina-
tion of many of the public interest broadcasting requirements. It 
instituted what was referred to as “postcard renewal” for broadcast 
                                                   
43. See, e.g., In re Application of The Titanic Corp. Radio Station WGGR, 34 F.C.C.2d 
501, 501–02 (1972) (granting license renewal to Duluth, Minnesota FM radio station 
WGGR, which aired virtually no public interest programming in its “all-music” format).  
44. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money: The FCC’s Big Giveaway Show, 241 Na-
tion 402, 402 (1985) (quoting a radio speech delivered by Mark Fowler). 
45. Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 
Tex. L. Rev. 207, 210 (1982) (urging Congress and the FCC to “focus on broadcasters not as 
fiduciaries of the public, as their regulators have historically perceived them, but as market-
place competitors”). 
46. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) (“Nothing in this [Act] shall be understood or construed to 
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals 
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or 
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of 
radio communication.”). 
47. Mark S. Fowler, The Public’s Interest, Address Before a Meeting of the Interna-
tional Radio and Television Society (Sept. 23, 1981), in Comm. & L., Winter 1982, at 51, 52.  
48. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661, 665 (1998) 
(“Chicago school law and economics, for example, argu[es] in the domain of antitrust, that 
the market will take care of the problem of monopoly or, in the domain of securities regula-
tion, that markets will clear themselves of failure.”); see also Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Take 
on Shasta County and the “New Chicago School,” 15 Yale J.L. & Human. 295 (2003); George J. 
Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & Econ. 
1 (1962). 
49. Fowler, supra note 47, at 52. 
Varona FTP.doc  2/24/2006 11:19 AM 
Winter 2006] Out of Thin Air 159 
 
licenses, which required no substantive licensee reporting or fed-
eral review of public interest programming.50 In August of 1987, 
the FCC also eliminated the Fairness Doctrine, which it had long 
touted as the centerpiece of the public trustee doctrine.51 The fair-
ness doctrine required broadcast licensees to “cover vitally 
important controversial issues of interest in their communities,” 
and in doing so, “provide a reasonable opportunity for the presen-
tation of contrasting viewpoints on those controversial issues of 
public importance that are covered.”52 The FCC agreed with the 
arguments of the broadcast lobby that the doctrine had a “chilling 
effect” on broadcasters’ speech.53  
B. The Public Trustee Obligations Today  
The deregulatory purge of the 1980s left commercial broadcast-
ers with very few tangible public interest programming obligations 
to compensate for their use of the public spectrum. Although tele-
vision broadcasters are still nominally required to air 
“programming that responds to issues of concern to the commu-
nity,”54 the FCC does not enforce the requirement.55 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that television licensees are criticized for air-
ing very little, and in many cases, no locally oriented public interest 
programming.56  
                                                   
50. See Varona, supra note 20, at 27–30.  
51. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049–50 (1987), 
aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
52. Id. at 5058 n.2. 
53. See id. at 5043 (citing In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules 
& Regulations Concerning Alternatives to the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. 
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.R. 145, 169 (1985) (“[I]n stark contravention of its purpose, [the fair-
ness doctrine] operates as a pervasive and significant impediment to the broadcasting of 
controversial issues of public importance.”)).  
54. See In re The Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertain-
ment Requirements, & Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 
F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom. Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
55. See Varona, supra note 20, at 33–37. 
56. For example, an October 2003 Alliance for Better Campaigns study of the pro-
gramming of forty-five television stations in seven cities found that less than one-half of one 
percent of the stations’ total programming was comprised of local public affairs program-
ming. Alliance for Better Campaigns, All Politics is Local, But You Wouldn’t 
Know It By Watching Local TV (2003); Jennifer Harper, Study Finds ‘Near Blackout’ of 
Local Public Issues on TV, Wash. Times, Oct. 28, 1993, at A10 (noting the study’s finding that 
“there were three times as many ‘Seinfeld’ reruns as local public-affairs shows on TV stations 
nationwide”); see also Philip M. Napoli, Market Conditions and Public Affairs 
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A key component of the local public affairs programming obli-
gation has been the coverage of political campaigns and elections, 
in that such coverage promotes an informed electorate.57 Yet a 
2002 Lear Center study found that of 10,000 local newscasts on 122 
television stations in the top fifty markets, only forty-four percent 
of those news broadcasts devoted any coverage at all to the elec-
toral campaigns leading up to the November 2002 elections.58 Of 
those that did, the aired stories averaged less than ninety seconds 
in length. Commercial broadcast coverage of the last Democratic 
and Republican presidential nominating conventions represented 
an all-time low, with ABC, CBS, and NBC each airing only three 
hours of coverage for each of the conventions59—a dramatic differ-
ence from the broadcast coverage of the 1972 conventions, which 
totaled 180 hours.60 The “free” networks explained their non-
coverage of the political conventions by pointing to the availability 
of the coverage via broadband video on their websites or on their 
cable network affiliates,61 making no provision for those Americans 
who could not afford the still-expensive monthly rates for broad-
band Internet access or cable subscription service.62  
Besides the unenforced and unsatisfied requirement that broad-
casters air locally oriented public interest programming, 
                                                   
Programming: Implications for Digital Television Policy: Report Prepared for the 
Benton Foundation 9 (2000) (concluding in a January 2000 study of 142 commercial tele-
vision stations in twenty-four major markets that stations aired an average of 1.1 hours of 
local public affairs programming in a two-week period, and that of 47,712 total surveyed 
programming hours, only 0.3% could be classified as local public affairs programming). 
57. See In re Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 
21,647 (1999) (“The Commission has long interpreted the statutory public interest standard 
as imposing an obligation on broadcast licensees to air programming regarding political 
campaigns.”). 
58. The Lear Center Local News Archive, Local TV News Coverage of the 2002 
General Election 4 (2003), available at http://learcenter.org/pdf/LCLNAReport.pdf. 
59. See Jim Rutenberg, Network Anchors Hold Fast to Their Dwindling 15 Minutes, N.Y. 
Times, July 26, 2004, at P1 (criticizing the major commercial networks for all but abandon-
ing convention coverage) (“We’re about to elect a president. . . . The fact that you three 
networks decided it as not important enough to run in prime time, the message that gives 
the American people is huge. . . . As a citizen, it bothers me.” (quoting the Public Broadcast-
ing Service’s Jim Lehrer)).  
60. See Editorial, Prime-Time Politics, Boston Globe, July 15, 2004, at A10. 
61. Joanne Ostrow, Party Confabs Falling to Cable, Denver Post, July 22, 2004, at F3. 
62. In February 2005, the FCC reported that the average monthly rate for cable service 
was $45.32 as of January 1, 2004. See In re Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992: Statistical Report on Average Rates for 
Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, & Equip., FCC 05-12, No. 92-266, ¶ 7 (Feb. 4, 
2005). The February 2006 version of the C|NET Editors’ ISP Buying Guide estimates that 
most residential broadband cable, DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), or satellite broadband 
access accounts “start around $40, though you can get a better deal if you buy other services, 
such as phone or digital TV, at the same time.” C|Net, C|Net Editors’ ISP Buying Guide 1, 
http://www.cnet.com/html/pdf/ba/bg/isp/isp.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
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broadcasters are subject to few additional public interest require-
ments. Television and radio broadcasters must afford candidates 
for federal elective office “reasonable access”63 to commercial ad-
vertising spots at the “lowest unit charge”64—resulting in at least 
$1.6 billion in 2004 political advertising revenue for television sta-
tions alone65—and “equal opportunities” for political candidates to 
respond to opponents’ appearances in station advertising or regu-
larly scheduled programming.66 They are categorically prohibited 
from transmitting “obscene” fare, and are required to restrict “in-
decent” programming between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 
A.M.67 Although television broadcasters are required to air pro-
gramming that serves the “educational and informational needs of 
children,”68 neither Congress nor the FCC has issued a detailed 
definition of what programs would so qualify, leading broadcasters 
to claim that such animated offerings as “The Flintstones” and 
“The Jetsons” qualify as children’s educational fare.69 
                                                   
63. FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2004).  
64. Id. § 73.1942. Stations are required to charge candidates for advertising time “the 
lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period” 
for 45 days in advance of a primary election and 60 days in advance of a general or special 
election. Id.  
65. Mark Memmott & Jim Drinkard, Election Ad Battle Smashes Record in 2004, USA To-
day, Nov. 25, 2004, at 6A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-11-
25-election-ads_x.htm (citing a report by the non-partisan Alliance for Better Campaigns 
that based its findings on research gathered by TNS Media Intelligence/Campaign Media 
Analysis Group).  
66. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 
(2004). This rule, which also is known as the “equal time” rule, requires that stations give 
candidates an opportunity to purchase advertising time equal to opponents, and also re-
quires stations to provide candidates a right to respond following the participation (and not 
mere coverage) of opponents in station programming. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.1941 (2004). 
67. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004); see also Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the indecency prohibition as 
constitutional). The FCC defines indecency as “language or material that, in context, depicts 
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community broadcast 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.” Id. at 657. 
68. Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 103(a)(2) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 
(2004). 
69. In re Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Revision of 
Programming Policies for Television Broad. Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,661–62 (1996); 
In re Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Revision of Pro-
gramming Policies for Television Broad. Stations, 8 F.C.C.R. 1841, 1842 (1993). The FCC 
requires broadcasters to limit advertising in programs directed primarily at children to 
twelve minutes per program hour on weekdays and 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends. 47 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (2004). In 1996, 
the FCC implemented a license renewal application “guideline” encouraging, but not re-
quiring, that television broadcasters air a minimum of three hours of children’s educational 
programming per week. Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, 11 
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Congress and the FCC continue to deregulate the broadcast in-
dustry, most significantly by lifting longstanding limitations on 
ownership concentration. Congress eliminated all regulatory limits 
on radio station ownership in the 1996 Telecom Act, which allowed 
Clear Channel Communications to dramatically increase its radio 
station holdings from 43 to 1,225 radio stations.70 In late 2002, the 
FCC initiated a proceeding aimed at raising the local and national 
television station ownership limits and eliminating the longstand-
ing prohibition on the common ownership of a same-city television 
station and newspaper in all but the smallest markets.71 The FCC 
adopted these regulations, which also raised the cap on the num-
ber of television stations one entity could own from a total 
audience reach of 35% to 45%,72 after receiving nearly 800,000 
public comments—99.9% opposing the changes.73 The regulations 
also increased the number of television stations a single entity 
could own to three in the nine largest media markets and two in 
the largest 162 markets.74 Responding to the public uproar, Con-
gress statutorily reduced the FCC’s new national ownership cap to 
a maximum reach of 39% of the national audience.75 
C. Why Broadcast Public Trusteeship Failed 
There is no shortage of scholarly and other opinions about why 
and how the public trustee doctrine has failed to produce the free 
                                                   
F.C.C.R. at 10,661–62. It defined that programming broadly, as “any television programming 
that furthers the educational and informational needs of children 16 years of age and under 
in any respect, including children’s intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional needs.” Id. at 
10,673 (quoting 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.671 (commercial stations), 73.672 (noncommercial sta-
tions)). 
70. John Helyar, Radio’s Stern Challenge: The Shock Jock Is Leaving AM/FM, Fortune, 
Nov. 1, 2004, at 123. 
71. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broad. Own-
ership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003).  
72. Id. Responding to over 342,000 messages from angry citizens, Congress statutorily 
lowered the FCC’s national ownership limit to 39% of national audience reach. See Powell 
Sees No Fast End to Media Rules Debate, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 2004, at C4.  
73. See Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Michael J. Copps, 
FCC Commissioner). 
74. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,668–69. 
75. See Powell Sees No Fast End to Media Rules Debate, supra note 72. In addition, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the FCC’s new same-city newspaper-television cross-
ownership rule and its local ownership rule on the grounds that the FCC had adopted them 
in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner without adequate evidentiary support. Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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marketplace of ideas envisioned by Congress and the early regula-
tors in the 1920s.76 In Changing Channels, I examined in detail some 
of the principal causes for the continuing dysfunction of public 
trusteeship.77 In brief, the public trustee doctrine has failed to live 
up to its lofty goals because of the intractable First Amendment, 
structural, and political contradictions upon which the doctrine 
was precariously premised.  
1. The First Amendment Paradox—There is an obvious and fun-
damental First Amendment contradiction between the 
broadcaster’s rights as a speaker and its obligations as a public trus-
tee. The FCC, in the words of the Supreme Court in 1973, must 
“walk a ‘tightrope’ to preserve the First Amendment values written 
into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act,” 
while simultaneously ensuring that broadcasters fulfill their obliga-
tion to the public.78 The Communications Act on the one hand 
requires the FCC to regulate broadcasters “consistent with the pub-
lic interest,”79 but on the other hand warns that “[n]othing in this 
[Act] shall be . . . construed to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted 
by any radio station.”80 The Act exalts broadcasters as public trus-
tees, giving them free use of the airwaves in exchange for 
affirmative content duties, but then declares that “no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated . . . by the Commission which shall 
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio commu-
nication.”81 
Despite this tension, the Supreme Court has upheld the au-
thority of the FCC to regulate broadcast content in furtherance of 
the public interest in every First Amendment challenge to the 
public trustee doctrine it has addressed. The Court’s earliest de-
fense of the public trustee doctrine was in the 1934 case of 
                                                   
76. See, e.g., Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 341 (1998); Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital 
Age, 1 CommLaw Conspectus 97 (2003); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: 
Why The Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2101 
(1997); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitu-
tionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1687 (1997); Matthew L. Spitzer, The 
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Tele-
vision and the Public Interest, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 499 (2000).  
77. See Varona, supra note 20, at 52–89. 
78. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973). 
The Court acknowledged the “difficulty and delicacy” of the FCC’s statutory duty to “oversee 
without censoring.” Id. at 118. 
79. 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
80. Id. at § 326. 
81. Id. 
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National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, which addressed the 
broadcast industry’s First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s 
“chain” or network broadcasting regulations.82 Rejecting the 
broadcasters’ argument that the FCC’s role was limited merely to 
serving as a “traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent 
stations from interfering with each other,” the Supreme Court de-
clared that instead of just merely supervising signal traffic, the FCC 
has “the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.”83 
Articulating what has since become known as the “scarcity ration-
ale,” Justice Frankfurter reasoned that: “Unlike other modes of 
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its 
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of ex-
pression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it 
cannot be used by all, some who may wish to use it must be de-
nied.”84 
In 1969, the Court again affirmed the scarcity rationale and the 
public trustee doctrine itself in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.85 
There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doc-
trine and related public interest rules by reasoning that 
broadcasting regulation’s primary purpose is “to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”86 As noted above, the fairness doctrine required broad-
casters to cover vitally important controversies in the communities 
they served and, when they did so, to provide contrasting view-
points.87 Broadcasters argued that the fairness doctrine infringed 
upon their right to free speech by dictating the content of their 
programming.88  
Rejecting the broadcasters’ arguments, the Red Lion Court reaf-
firmed the scarcity rationale, reasoning that because “there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there 
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle [for broadcasters] to posit an 
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to 
                                                   
82. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1934).  
83. Id. at 215–16. 
84. Id. at 226. 
85. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  
86. Id. at 388. 
87. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110–12 
(1973); see also In re Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. In-
terest Standards of the Commc’ns Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 1 (1974), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Citizens 
Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
88. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 (noting that the broadcasters alleged “that the rules 
abridge their freedom of speech and press” and that the First Amendment “protect[ed] 
their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they 
choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency”).  
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the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”89 In light 
of the scarcity of broadcast licenses, “[i]t is the right of the viewers 
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount.”90 The Court concluded that:  
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the 
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency 
with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary 
with obligations to present those views and voices which are 
representative of his community and which would otherwise, 
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.91  
The Supreme Court continued to reaffirm the constitutionality 
of the public trustee doctrine during the four decades following 
Red Lion,92 largely rejecting the attacks against the doctrine by 
broadcasters93 and scholars who repeatedly have criticized the scar-
city rationale as unfounded and obsolete. The National Association 
of Broadcasters (NAB), for example, has argued that broadcast 
speech should no longer be subject to public trustee constraints 
because scarcity is a thing of the past. It claims that “the number of 
broadcast facilities [has] exploded” since Red Lion was decided and 
                                                   
89. Id. at 388. 
90. Id. at 390. 
91. Id. at 389.  
92. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (refusing to apply the scarcity ration-
ale to the Internet); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (citing the 
importance of local television service in upholding the constitutionality of the FCC’s “must-
carry” rules requiring cable television systems to carry the signals of local television stations); 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (citing the public trustee doctrine in upholding 
the constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency rules). Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the major-
ity of the Court in Turner noted that the Supreme Court’s prior cases “permitted more 
intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media.” Turner, 512 U.S. 
at 637. He then reiterated the scarcity rationale: 
[T]here are more would-be broadcasters than frequencies available in the electro-
magnetic spectrum. And if two broadcasters were to attempt to transmit over the 
same frequency in the same locale, they would interfere with one another’s signals, so 
that neither could be heard at all. The scarcity of broadcast frequencies thus required 
the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spec-
trum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters. In addition, the 
inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast 
medium has been thought to require some adjustment in traditional First Amend-
ment analysis to permit the Government to place limited content restraints, and 
impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees. 
Id. 
93. Some broadcasters have gone so far as to dispute the government’s claim that the 
airwaves are a public resource. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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that “the vast increase in the number and variety of non-broadcast 
outlets (including cable, Direct Broadcast Satellite and the Inter-
net) makes the idea of ‘scarcity’ . . . seem almost quaint.”94 
Professor Cass Sunstein agrees with the broadcasters in this re-
spect, writing that “[l]icenses are no longer technologically scarce, 
thanks in part to cable television; the spectrum can be made avail-
able to remarkably many people, and the number is increasing.”95 
Judge Robert Bork, echoing the criticism first articulated by 
celebrated Chicago School economist Ronald H. Coase,96 articu-
lates the view that there is no intelligible justification 
distinguishing spectrum scarcity in broadcasting from resource 
scarcity in other communications media. He writes that although 
“[i]t is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce . . . it is 
unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in 
a way that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of 
the print media.”97 Judge Bork reasons that “[a]ll economic goods 
are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, computers, 
and other resources that go into the production and dissemination 
of journalism.”98 
These attacks on the scarcity rationale interpret the Supreme 
Court’s conception of scarcity too broadly. There is no debating 
the contention that there is now a proliferation of media sources 
and content of every sort available to the average American. There 
also is no question that source scarcity has been a component of the 
Supreme Court’s scarcity rationale. Because the broadcaster’s role 
is that of “a public trustee charged with the duty of fairly and im-
partially informing the public audience,”99 it is true that the 
availability of alternative sources of information advances the ulti-
mate objective of broadcasting regulation. In repeatedly upholding 
                                                   
94. Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters at 12–13, In re Pub. Interest Obligations 
of TV Broad. Licensees, No. 99-360 (FCC Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
cgb/dro/comments/99360/5006314422.pdf. 
95. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 54 (1995) 
(“Because licenses are not scarce, the doctrine can no longer be justified as an effort to 
promote diversity in programming.”); see also Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the 
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 Geo. L.J. 245, 279 (2003) (arguing that 
direct broadcast satellite and other “multichannel video program distributors” (MVPDs) 
“have, in effect, eliminated the scarcity of the spectrum as a constraint to television-based 
communications”).  
96. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission System, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 
14–18 (1959) (“[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the 
economic system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount 
and scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists.”). 
97. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
98. Id. 
99. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973). 
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the scarcity rationale, however, the Supreme Court has not equated 
the scarcity of content sources with the more specific “allocational” 
or license scarcity in the broadcast medium specifically.100 As the 
Red Lion Court made clear, scarcity exists “[w]here there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are 
frequencies to allocate.”101 The Supreme Court has not interpreted 
“frequencies” or “licenses” in the figurative sense, encompassing all 
modes of mass communication, but instead in the more restrictive 
literal sense, confining its scarcity analysis to the limited capacity of 
the broadcast spectrum alone.102 
Although critics are correct in acknowledging that new cable, 
satellite television, and Internet technologies have dramatically in-
creased the diversity of content sources and the opportunities for 
speakers to access mass audiences, those new technologies have 
done nothing to lessen the persistent scarcity in broadcast fre-
quencies available for license. And while it is true that spectrum 
management developments have enabled the FCC to wrest more 
assignable frequencies from the spectrum,103 there remains an ex-
treme mismatch between available broadcast licenses and market 
demand. There are only 1,368 commercial television stations on 
both the UHF and VHF bands in the United States,104 with few ad-
ditional licenses available. In fact, the FCC warns potential 
broadcast license applicants to “be aware that frequencies for these 
services are always in heavy demand,” and that in 2004, “the Com-
mission received approximately 30,000 inquiries from persons 
seeking to start radio broadcast stations” alone.105 
In addition, the notion that the scarcity of broadcast spectrum is 
materially indistinguishable from the scarcity of other media re-
sources overlooks the inherent fixed capacity of the radio 
frequency spectrum. Broadcast spectrum is rivalrous. One channel 
                                                   
100. See Varona, supra note 20, at 57–64. 
101. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). 
102. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994) (refusing to 
apply broadcast precedent to the cable context) (“The broadcast cases are inapposite in the 
present context because cable television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that 
characterize the broadcast medium.”). 
103. See Yoo, supra note 95, at 279 (discussing the use of tighter channel spacing, 
“spread spectrum” technologies, lower power, and other developments for the increase in 
available broadcast channels). 
104. News Release, FCC, Broadcast Station Totals as of June 30, 2005 (Aug. 29, 2005), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260747A1.pdf. By 
contrast, there are only 379 non-commercial, public television stations, and 13,557 AM and 
FM stations. Id.  
105. FCC, How to Apply for a Broadcast Station (2005), http://www.fcc.gov/mb/ 
audio/howtoapply.html.  
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of frequency cannot be used by two speakers simultaneously with-
out rendering the channel useless from interference.106 By contrast, 
newsprint and Internet web pages are nonrivalrous. Anyone who 
wishes to publish a newspaper or web page may do so.107 There is 
enough newsprint and space on the Internet to accommodate all 
or at least most interested speakers. Although there are economic 
barriers to entry into newspaper and Internet publishing, there 
also are economic barriers to entry into broadcasting. Just as news-
paper publishers must purchase printing presses and newsprint, 
broadcasters must purchase cameras and transmitters. What is ma-
terially different, however, is that the medium through which 
newspaper publishers disseminate their message—newsprint—is 
owned exclusively by them. By contrast, the broadcast medium re-
mains a publicly owned and administered resource provisionally 
entrusted to broadcasters.  
Although the scarcity rationale supporting public trusteeship is 
still defensible, the FCC has avoided walking the First Amendment 
“tightrope” altogether. Regardless of whether its failure to imple-
ment meaningful public interest programming obligations is 
attributable to a hyper-sensitivity to the rationale’s criticisms, an 
abundance of caution against infringing broadcast speech, or to 
the other contradictions inherent in broadcast regulation, the 
practical result has been that public interest programming is what-
ever the broadcasters say it is.  
2. The Structural Paradox—Despite congressional and FCC in-
tentions, the effectiveness of the public trustee doctrine is vexed 
additionally by the unsuitability of the broadcast spectrum for host-
ing a free marketplace of ideas. The marketplace metaphor has its 
origins in John Milton’s Areopagitica, which rejected the govern-
ment licensing of speech in favor of the “free and open encounter” 
between truth and falsehood,108 and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 
which advocated “the clearer perception and livelier impression of 
                                                   
106. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1942) (acknowledging that 
at the inception of broadcasting and before spectrum regulation, signal interference caused 
“confusion and chaos” because “[w]ith everybody on the air, nobody could be heard”).  
107. But cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment 
Violation, 52 Duke L.J. 1, 41–42 (2002) (discussing, inter alia, the distinction between  
rivalrous and nonrivalrous resources, and contending that the scarcity distinction between 
broadcast spectrum and other media is problematic) (“If two people try to print on the 
same paper at the same time, or to talk into the same tin can tied to a string at the same 
time, or for that matter to sit in the same chair at the same time, they will interfere with one 
another.”). Broadcast spectrum is fundamentally different from Professor Benjamin’s hypo-
thetical paper, tin can, and chair, in that spectrum is publicly owned, whereas those other 
items presumably are not. 
108. John Milton, Areopagitica 74 (Sir Richard C. Jobb ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1918) (1644), available at http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/areopagitica.html. 
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truth, produced by its collision with error.”109 It was woven into 
American First Amendment jurisprudence by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who wrote in 1919 that “the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market.”110  
The marketplace metaphor is especially relevant to issues of 
democratic self-governance. Professor Sunstein calls this the 
“Madisonian conception of free speech.”111 One of the principal 
authors of the Constitution, James Madison considered the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to be the cultivation of an informed 
and enlightened electorate that, as sovereign, would be empow-
ered by reasoned discussion and access to a diversity of opinion to 
make good decisions for the democracy.112 First Amendment 
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn also studied this Madisonian per-
spective and concluded that because citizens in a democracy are 
self-governed, they must have access to “the unhindered flow of 
accurate information” in order to make the best decisions.113  
It is not difficult to see how broadcasting fails to satisfy the re-
quirements of a marketplace of ideas. Television and radio 
generally do not provide fora for “free and open encounters” be-
tween competing ideas. They do not provide interactive platforms 
for free debate, and they do not present citizens with an “unhin-
dered flow” of information to inform their self-governance.114 Quite 
to the contrary, commercial broadcasting is unidirectional, highly 
mediated, and often criticized for transmitting distortions, not re-
flections, of reality.115  
Instead of serving as a marketplace of ideas, where public inter-
est programming is a commodity, commercial broadcasting in 
reality is a marketplace of viewers in which advertisers buy access to 
                                                   
109. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in Utilitarianism, Liberty 
and Representative Government 102, 104 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed., 1951). Both Milton’s 
and Mill’s ideas made their way into Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s articulation of the 
marketplace of ideas in his 1919 Abrams v. United States dissent, where he wrote that “the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
110. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
111. Sunstein, supra note 95, at xvii.  
112. Id. at xvi–xvii. 
113. Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of 
the People 19 (1960). 
114. See Varona, supra note 20, at 64–66. 
115. See id.  
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audiences.116 As Professor Sunstein memorably characterized it, 
commercial television treats “eyeballs as the commodity.”117 The 
romantic notion of broadcaster as public trustee simply does not 
reflect a reality in which broadcasters, many of whom are beholden 
primarily to shareholders demanding optimal profit, make deci-
sions only by looking at the advertising-driven bottom line.118 
Because democracy-feeding public interest programming earns 
lower ratings than more sensational fare, the true market demand 
does not justify its inclusion in the programming schedule. In addi-
tion, the rapidly increasing consolidation of the broadcast 
industry119 has made it even more difficult for broadcasters to fulfill 
their duty to air programming that is responsive to the needs of 
their local communities.120  
3. The Political Paradox—Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the extraordinary political influence of the broadcast lobby has 
played a key role in the inability, or unwillingness, of Congress and 
the FCC to devise and enforce durable substantive public interest 
programming requirements. The FCC is a textbook example of an 
administrative agency “captured”121 by the industry it regulates. The 
commercial broadcast industry has one of the most influential122 
                                                   
116. The Supreme Court itself recognized the importance of advertising to commercial 
television in upholding the FCC’s rules requiring cable television systems to carry free over-
the-air television stations on their basic tiers of service. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994) (“[T]he must-carry rules ensure that broadcast television stations 
will retain a large enough potential audience to earn necessary advertising revenue . . . to 
maintain their continued operation.”). 
117. Sunstein, supra note 76, at 514. 
118. See Varona, supra note 20, at 67–69. 
119. For an excellent analysis of the effects of media consolidation on local broadcast 
service, see Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels Earning 
Wings, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 613 (2004); see also Varona, supra note 20, at 71–77. 
120. One of the most alarming recent manifestations of the problem of media consoli-
dation is that of the Minot, North Dakota market, where Clear Channel Communications—
which owns 1,240 radio stations in 292 markets—owns all six of the commercial radio sta-
tions. Katy Bachman, Fighting Through the Static, Mediaweek, May 5, 2003, at 20. In January 
2002, local public safety authorities could not reach anyone at any of the stations for help in 
warning local residents of the need to avoid the area of a hazardous chemical spill. Id. The 
stations were inaccessible because they were all being remotely operated from the Clear 
Channel corporate headquarters in San Antonio, Texas, and were airing pre-recorded feeds. 
Id. 
121. Marver Bernstein was the first to describe the phenomenon of agency capture, 
whereby an agency becomes so entangled with the industry it regulates that it ultimately is 
controlled by the most powerful interests in that industry. Marver H. Bernstein, Regulat-
ing Business By Independent Commission 79–97 (1955). Thomas W. Merill describes 
agency capture as “meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to 
domination by the industry they were charged with regulating.” Thomas W. Merrill, Capture 
Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1043 (1997). 
122. The National Association of Broadcasters, the broadcasters’ principal trade asso-
ciation, has been called a “lobbying juggernaut in Washington” that “steamroll[s] the 
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and wealthy123 lobbying operations in Washington. The industry’s 
lobbyists lavish gifts upon the legislators and regulators charged 
with overseeing broadcasters.124 The “golden revolving door,” typi-
cal in other capture cases,125 can be found between the broadcast 
industry and regulators as well, with many prominent regulators 
and lawmakers becoming industry leaders and advisors them-
selves.126 The great political influence of the broadcast lobby is 
fueled not only by money, but also by the broadcasters’ unique 
ability to provide positive, negative, or worse yet, no coverage of an 
elected official or senior political appointee back home.127 It is not 
surprising, then, that NAB President Edward O. Fritts can boast that 
“no one has more sway with members of Congress than the local 
broadcaster.”128 As evidenced by the broadcasters’ controversial 
                                                   
opposition.” Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, 35 Nat’l J. 2560, 2560 (2003). 
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), who as chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee over-
sees the FCC, has referred to the broadcast lobby as “one of the most powerful influences 
here in Washington.” Alicia Mundy, Big John Takes Charge, Mediaweek, Dec. 16, 1996, at 17.  
123. In the four years following the enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 
the fifty largest media firms spent $111 million in lobbying expenses. Robert McChesney, 
The Problem of the Media 55 n.147 (2004) (citing data from the Center for Public Integ-
rity); see also Varona, supra note 20, at 82–83.  
124. In a May 2003 report, the Center for Public Integrity documented that between 
May 1995 and February 2003, senior FCC officials had accepted gifts of airfare, lodging, and 
entertainment expenses totaling nearly $2.8 million, much of it from broadcasters. See Bob 
Williams & Morgan Jindrich, On the Road Again—and Again: FCC Officials Rack Up $2.8 Mil-
lion Travel Tab with Industries They Regulate, Center for Pub. Integrity, May 22, 2003, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=15. 
125. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 
16 (1990) (noting that following the capture of an agency by a regulated industry, “the regu-
latory scheme is maintained in the interest of the regulated industry by bureaucrats who 
look both to Congress and to the industry for their rewards” which can include “the pros-
pects of further career opportunities in the private sector”).  
126. Michael K. Powell, FCC Chairman between January 2001 and January 2005, is now 
a senior advisor at Providence Equity Partners, where he advises the communications in-
vestment firm and its clients on “regulatory issues in the media.” Former FCC Chairman 
Michael Powell Joins Providence Equity Partners as Senior Advisor, Bus. Wire, Aug. 11, 2005. Mr. 
Powell joins a cadre of former FCC Chairmen who departed the FCC for lucrative posts 
advising the FCC’s regulatees, including Charles D. Ferris, Mark Fowler, Reed Hundt, Wil-
liam Kennard, Dennis Patrick, and Richard Wiley. See Michael K. Powell’s Golden Revolving 
Door, Center for Digital Democracy, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.democraticmedia.org/ 
news/washingtonwatch/FCCrevolvingdoor.html. 
127. See Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, New Republic, May 5, 1997, at 20, 21. Taylor 
notes that broadcasters “hold the ticket to every congressman’s heart—access to the six 
o’clock news.” Id. He posits that elected officials and regulators “live in a world where image 
is a fragile commodity, where paranoia is a survival tool and where it’s taken as a given that if 
the station manager, the news director and the anchorman think you’re a helluva guy, that’s 
a very good thing.” Id. Former Congressman Henson Moore (R-La.) agrees, noting that 
“[o]bviously, the broadcasters report the news, so I think most people in elective politics 
listen to them.” Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 122, at 2562. 
128. Taylor, supra note 127, at 20.  
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“free” transition to digital spectrum, the industry also has an ability 
not to cover themselves at all when the broadcast industry and its 
lobbyists engage in questionable or otherwise newsworthy activities. 
There is little wonder, therefore, that loud FCC and congressional 
demands for more broadcaster accountability as trustees of the 
public’s airwaves consistently are silenced by the industry’s manipu-
lation of those airwaves.129 
III. Applying Public Forum Analysis to  
Broadcast Regulation 
A. The Public Forum Doctrine as an Alternative Justification 
for Broadcast Public Trusteeship 
Although its defenders have justified the public trustee doctrine 
by continued reliance on the embattled scarcity rationale, some 
scholars and commentators have appealed to the Supreme Court’s 
public forum analysis to provide an alternative justification for the 
unique quid pro quo of broadcasting regulation.130  
1. Overview of the Public Forum Doctrine—Before its elucidation of 
the public forum doctrine in 1939, the Supreme Court discerned 
no difference between the rights of private and government prop-
erty owners in restricting speech on property they owned. For 
example, in Davis v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a 
conviction for speaking on Boston Common without a permit.131 In 
holding that the government has a right both to restrict and allow 
access to publicly held property, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the 
authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be 
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.”132  
Forty years later, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning in 
Davis and articulated what became known as the public forum doc-
trine in Hague v. CIO.133 In Hague, the Court voided a Jersey City, 
New Jersey ordinance that forbade public meetings and the distri-
bution of printed materials in streets and other public places 
                                                   
129. See Varona, supra note 20, at 84–89 (detailing the broadcast industry’s effective si-
lencing of demands for digital television licenses). 
130. See infra note 173. 
131. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). 
132. Id. 
133. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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without a permit.134 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts articu-
lated what continues to serve as the fundamental tenet of public 
forum analysis:  
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immu-
nities, rights, and liberties of citizens.135  
In striking down the Jersey City ordinance as violative of the First 
Amendment, Justice Roberts noted that “[t]he privilege of a citizen 
of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication 
of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of 
all,” but that “it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or 
denied.”136 The Hague Court reasoned that by interfering with the 
right of citizens to use public areas for meetings and the dissemina-
tion of their messages, the Jersey City ordinance not only violated 
these citizens’ First Amendment right to speech, but also their right 
to peaceful assembly.137 Justice Roberts wrote that the right to gather 
and discuss issues of community importance is fundamental to de-
mocracy. He posited that “[c]itizenship of the United States would 
be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to dis-
cuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and 
opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.”138 Professor Harry 
Kalven characterized the Hague plurality as having created “a kind of 
First-Amendment easement” on public property.139 
The Supreme Court refined its conceptualization of the public 
forum doctrine in a number of relatively recent decisions, most im-
portantly Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
                                                   
134. Id. at 518. The Hague case was brought by the Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion and several private citizens who had applied for permits to distribute written materials 
on Jersey City streets in support of union movement and were denied. Id. at 500–03. 
135. Id. at 515.  
136. Id. at 515–16. 
137. Id. at 512–13. 
138. Id. at 513. The Hague Court declared that “[t]he very idea of a government, repub-
lican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in 
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” Id. (quoting Unites 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)).  
139. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 1, 13. 
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Association.140 In Perry, the Court refused to find a public forum in an 
interschool mail and teacher mailbox system in Perry Township, 
Indiana, public schools.141 In so doing, the Court refined its defini-
tion of the public forum doctrine by identifying three principal 
categories of fora—traditional, designated and nonpublic—and pre-
scribed tests for each.  
Traditional public fora are those, like the sidewalks, streets, and 
parks discussed in Hague, that encompass public spaces typically re-
served by government for “public assembly and debate.”142 In these 
“quintessential public forums,” the government may not prohibit all 
speech or other communicative activity.143 To enforce a content-
based restriction in such a traditional public forum, the government 
must show that the restriction is “necessary to serve  
a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end.”144 The Perry Court recognized that the government may 
prescribe restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the speech 
or expressive conduct, so long as such restrictions are  
content-neutral, “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion.”145  
Designated public fora are those pieces of public property that 
the government has opted to open “for use by the public as a place 
for expressive activity.”146 The Supreme Court has further classified 
designated public fora into the categories of unlimited and limited 
categories.147 Unlimited designated public fora include government-
owned properties, like a municipally-owned auditorium available to 
the public at large,148 that are available for use by virtually all inter-
ested speakers. By contrast, limited designated public fora comprise 
government-owned properties that are not accessible to the general 
                                                   
140. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
141. Id. at 44–47. 
142. Id. at 45. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
145. Id. (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 
132 (1981); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535–36 (1980); Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)). 
146. Id. In 1985, the Supreme Court clarified that “[t]he government does not create a 
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally open-
ing a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (holding that the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), 
an annual charity drive appealing to federal employees, was a nonpublic forum). 
147. For an excellent overview of the Supreme Court’s categorization of public fora, see 
Logan, supra note 76. 
148. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
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public, but instead are “for use by certain speakers, or for the discus-
sion of certain subjects.”149 For example, the court has classified as 
limited designated public fora public university meeting facilities,150 
student activities funds,151 and municipal school board meetings.152  
In administering designated unlimited public fora, the govern-
ment is bound by the same first amendment requirements invoked 
by traditional public fora for as long as the character of the facility 
remains a designated public forum.153 As with traditional public 
fora, the government may impose reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions, and content-based prohibitions that are “nar-
rowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”154 In the case 
of designated limited public fora, the government, in “confining a 
forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was cre-
ated,” may impose content-based speech restrictions that are 
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”155  
The third public forum classification, that of a nonpublic forum 
owned or controlled by the government, applies where there is 
public property that “is not by tradition or designation a forum for 
public communication . . . .”156 In these fora, which the Court often 
treats interchangeably with limited designated public fora for First 
Amendment purposes,157 the government may impose time, place, 
and manner regulations and restrict the forum’s use to its intended 
purpose “as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are not an 
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials op-
pose the speaker’s view.”158 Whereas content-specific regulation in 
traditional and designated public fora is subjected to the strict 
                                                   
149. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
150. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a state university that makes 
its meeting facilities available to registered student organizations could not constitutionally 
bar use of the facilities by a registered student organization for purposes of religious worship 
and fellowship). 
151. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that 
the University of Virginia’s “Student Activities Fund,” which subsidized a plethora of student 
activities and publications, was a limited public forum).  
152. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 167 (1976). 
153. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
154. Id. at 46 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 262–70). 
155. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). The government also may impose time, place, and manner 
restrictions, but must not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Id. 
156. Id.  
157. See Logan, supra note 76, at 1714 (“[R]egulation of both limited public forums and 
nonpublic forums receive similar, more deferential First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
158. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998) (quoting 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); see also Logan, supra note 76, at 1713–14. 
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scrutiny described above, such regulation in nonpublic fora is re-
quired only to be reasonable.159 Quoting its opinion in Adderley v. 
Florida, the Perry Court reasoned that “[the] State, no less than a 
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property  
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”160 
The Supreme Court has held that non-public fora include a mu-
nicipally-owned, public television station’s political debate,161 a 
government-administered charitable drive directed at federal em-
ployees,162 Internet terminals in public libraries,163 and a passageway 
connecting a U.S. Post Office to its parking lot.164 
2. The Affirmative Public Forum Doctrine—A cursory review of the 
public forum doctrine and its attendant case law may suggest that 
the public forum doctrine is entirely reactive, responding only to 
the First Amendment challenges of speakers who claim interfer-
ence with their speech on public property. A closer examination, 
however, reveals that the underlying purposes of the public forum 
doctrine suggest a First Amendment interest in the government’s 
affirmative provision, and not just preservation, of public fora. 
Professor Franklyn S. Haiman posits that “[a]ffirmative action by 
the government to enhance citizen expression [by] making avail-
able public sidewalks, streets, and parks for speeches or 
demonstrations” has “long been recognized as a minimal contribu-
tion expected of the state to the facilitation of a marketplace of 
ideas.”165 Professor Steven G. Gey agrees, arguing that “every cul-
ture must have venues in which citizens can confront each other’s 
ideas and ways of thinking about the world.”166  
                                                   
159. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
806 (“[C]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and 
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum and are content neutral.”). 
160. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (quoting 
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129–30 (1981); Greer 
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).  
161. See Forbes, 523 U.S. 666. 
162. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788. 
163. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
164. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720. The “postal sidewalk” in question was on Postal Service 
property and provided the only connection between the Post Office and its parking lot. Id. 
at 723.  
165. Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society 297–98 (1981). 
166. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1535, 1538–39 (1998). Professor Gey concedes that this “noble heritage” of the public 
forum doctrine is “antiquated and somewhat inaccurate,” considering that “speakers on 
street corners have rarely been as concerned with communicating Truth as they have been 
focused on winning converts or motivating those who are already converted.” Id. He notes 
further, however, that even if the public forum doctrine’s nobility is based on myth, “it is a 
myth that is indispensable to democracy . . . .” Id. at 1539. 
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Professor Laurence H. Tribe also advocates an affirmative com-
ponent to the public forum doctrine, writing that “the public 
forum doctrine is an important recognition that it is not enough 
for government to refrain from invading certain areas of liberty,” 
but that “the state may, even at some cost to the public fisc, have to 
provide at least a minimally adequate opportunity for the exercise 
of certain freedoms.”167 First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla 
similarly concludes that a democracy requires that “every city, vil-
lage, and hamlet in the nation should have at least one central 
gathering point that is treated as a traditional public forum.”168 Be-
cause open and accessible public fora are a fundamental 
requirement for a free and healthy democracy, federal, state and 
local governments collect taxes to fund the creation and preserva-
tion of such public spaces.169  
An affirmative government interest in the provision of public 
fora for expressive activities is consistent with the traditional un-
derstanding of the importance of speech to the development of 
the individual and democracy itself. Justice Brandeis observed that 
“public discussion is a political duty” and “that the greatest menace 
to freedom is an inert people.”170 Public fora operate as important 
“safety valves” for the release of public passions,171 as well as impor-
tant sectors of a free marketplace of democratic ideas. Professor 
Alexander Meiklejohn counseled that because citizens of a democ-
racy are self-governed, they must have access to “the unhindered 
flow of accurate information” and the public fora in which to  
                                                   
167. Tribe, supra note 17, at 786, 979–80, 998, quoted in Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, 
Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1535, 1552 n.85 (2005).  
168. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 208 (1992). Professors Gey 
and Smolla are not alone in suggesting that the government has an affirmative obligation to 
provide public fora. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 
645 (1970), reprinted in Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doc-
trine, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 163, 167 n.17 (2002) (“One important way in which the government 
can affirmatively promote a system of freedom of expression is by making available to indi-
viduals and groups the facilities for engaging in expression.”); Lillian R. BeVier, 
Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 101 (discuss-
ing how the First Amendment “imposes affirmative duties on government to maximize the 
opportunities for expression”).  
169. Wasserman, supra note 168, at 197–98 (arguing that accessible public fora “are es-
sential to preserving individual liberty, democracy, and an open society, all of which can 
flourish only if citizens are ‘free to speak Truth to Power’ ”); see also Gey, supra note 166, at 
1538 (“According to the noble myth of the public forum, protecting such speakers is essen-
tial to preserving a Western democratic culture, because democracy can only flourish if 
citizens are free to speak Truth to Power.”).  
170. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
171. See T. Barton Carter et al., The First Amendment and the Fourth Estate: 
The Law of Mass Media, 37 (9th ed. 2005) (discussing the importance of “blowing off 
steam” to the self-fulfillment rationales for freedom of expression). 
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debate and deliberate in order to make the best and wisest 
decisions.172  
B. Broadcast Spectrum as Public Forum 
With the public trustee doctrine under increasing attack as inef-
fective and obsolete, a number of commentators have proposed an 
alternative justification for broadcasting regulation in both the re-
active and affirmative interpretations of the public forum 
doctrine.173 One argument is that broadcast spectrum itself could 
be classified as a limited public forum, thereby allowing the gov-
ernment to regulate the content of broadcaster speech.174 Its 
premise is that Congress made clear in both the 1927 Radio Act 
and the 1934 Communications Act that the frequencies utilized by 
broadcasters are public property.175 The 1934 Communications Act 
declares that: 
It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain 
the control of the United States over all the channels of inter-
state and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the 
use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by per-
sons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by 
                                                   
172. Meiklejohn, supra note 113, at 19.  
173. See Charles W. Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Consti-
tutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1687 (1997); see also Graham, supra note 76, 
at 141 (2003) (“The broadcast medium is arguably a limited public forum.”); Reed Hundt & 
Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for 
Children’s Educational Television, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 11, 21 (1996) (“[I]n licensing out part 
of the public airwaves for free, Congress has conferred on broadcasters an enormous sub-
sidy that carries important First Amendment consequences. Here, as in other contexts, the 
government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions on a private party’s use of 
public resources.”); Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persis-
tence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 976, 996–97 
(1997); Spitzer, supra note 76, at 1028–66 (arguing that the public forum doctrine could 
serve as an alternative foundation for broadcast speech regulation, but theorizing that gov-
ernment cannot constitutionally “own” all broadcast spectrum). 
174. Before criticizing this approach, Professor Spitzer envisions such an argument be-
ginning this way:  
“First,” the Court might say, “it is true that all existing rationales for treating broad-
casting differently from print under the first amendment fail. However, the 
government owns all of the electromagnetic spectrum (citing Red Lion [Broad. Co., 
395 U.S. 367 (1969)]). Therefore, we must decide if radio spectrum is a traditional 
public forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum.” 
Spitzer, supra note 76, at 1038. 
175. See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162. 
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Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to 
create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of 
the license.176  
Broadcasters do not own the frequencies through which they 
transmit their signals, but instead hold them in trust for the 
American people, the true owners of the spectrum. As is the case 
with other intangible fora, like the student activities fee in Rosenber-
ger,177 the broadcast spectrum is public property that serves as an 
important platform for speech and, as such, must yield to the de-
mands of the First Amendment. 
The broadcast spectrum does not qualify as a traditional public 
forum. Unlike the public streets and parks, it has not “immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions.”178 By function of its scarcity and limited 
capacity, the broadcast spectrum cannot accommodate all or even 
many of the speakers that wish to use it as a platform. By that same 
measure, the broadcast spectrum also is not an unlimited desig-
nated public forum, defined as “public property . . . the State has 
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”179 
Unlike the public university meeting facilities,180 student activities 
fund,181 and school board meetings182 classified by the Supreme 
Court as unlimited designated public fora, broadcast frequencies 
cannot accommodate all, or even most, interested speakers.183 In 
addition, the broadcast spectrum is not classifiable as a nonpublic 
government forum considering that in such a forum, “the govern-
ment is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, 
                                                   
176. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934).  
177. As Charles W. Logan notes, the Supreme Court has applied forum analysis to tan-
gible as well as intangible property. See Logan, supra note 76, at 1710–11 (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (declaring that 
a student activities fund was “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense, but the same principles are applicable”)). 
178. Hague v. Comm’n for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
179. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
180. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
181. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
182. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 
167 (1976). 
183. See Logan, supra note 76, at 1711 (“The Communications Act expressly states [at 47 
U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000)] that broadcasters are not to be treated as common carriers—a 
conduit for the speech of others.”). 
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rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or li-
cense.”184 
If the broadcast spectrum qualifies as a public forum at all, it 
would best fit within the classification of limited designated public 
forum.185 As in the case of other limited designated public fora, like 
the student activities fund at issue in Rosenberger, broadcast spec-
trum is limited to select speakers—i.e., the broadcasters 
themselves—who are required to abide by certain content restric-
tions.186 As is the case with other limited public fora, the 
government may constitutionally restrict access to the broadcast 
spectrum through the licensing and renewal mechanism, and can 
impose content-based regulations so long as they do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of viewpoint and are “reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum.”187 The government also may impose 
time, place, and manner restrictions, as it does in the case of inde-
cency.188  
If broadcast spectrum indeed could be classified as a limited des-
ignated public forum, then the constitutionality of broadcast 
content regulation is not beholden to the public trust doctrine and 
the precarious scarcity rationale for its survival. Affirmative pro-
gramming obligations, like the duty to air local public affairs, 
educational programming, and political candidate advertising, as 
well as negative programming restrictions, such as indecency and 
children’s television advertising proscriptions, could survive as 
“reasonable in light of the purpose served” by the broadcasting 
medium. 
Although this analysis is enticing, it has a number of notable 
shortcomings that question its viability. For example, some com-
mentators who identify the public forum doctrine as a potential 
alternative to the embattled scarcity rationale have acknowledged 
that it may not provide a sufficient basis upon which to distinguish 
the First Amendment treatment of broadcasters from competing 
media players, such as newspapers.189 In addition, Professor Mat-
thew Spitzer has posited that the public forum rationale is a 
theoretically workable one for purposes of upholding broadcast 
regulation, but that the First Amendment itself may forbid the 
                                                   
184. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). 
185. Logan, supra note 76, at 1713; see also Graham, supra note 76, at 141 (“The broad-
cast medium is arguably a limited public forum.”). 
186. See Graham, supra note 76, at 141. 
187. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985)). 
188. Id. at 829. 
189. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Regulating Broadcast 
Programming 225–29 (1994).  
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government from owning the entire broadcast spectrum.190 There 
also has been some concern that the Supreme Court itself has cir-
cumscribed broadcast regulation from the application of public 
forum analysis. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. 
Forbes, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “the public forum 
doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical way to the very 
different context of public television broadcasting.”191 In that case, 
the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC), an Ar-
kansas state agency that operates a network of five non-commercial 
(i.e., public) stations across the state, refused to invite independent 
candidate Ralph Forbes to participate in an AETC-aired debate for 
Arkansas’s Third Congressional District seat.192 The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled in Forbes’s favor, finding that the televised 
debate was a public forum.193 The Supreme Court disagreed, rea-
soning that “public broadcasting as a general matter does not lend 
itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine,” and that “[c]laims of 
access under our public forum precedents could obstruct the le-
gitimate purposes of television broadcasters”194 by transferring 
control over legitimate journalistic and editorial decisions from 
broadcasters to private individuals “who bring suit under our fo-
rum precedents.”195  
One commentator characterized the Forbes decision as “a rejec-
tion of the notion that the broadcast spectrum generally 
constitutes a public forum because the application of the public 
forum doctrine is even less tenable in the context of private broad-
casting than in public broadcasting.”196 I disagree. While the Forbes 
case seriously hinders the ability of political candidates to rely 
upon the public forum doctrine in demanding access to broadcast 
debates, it has little if any bearing on the theory that the broadcast 
spectrum itself is a limited public forum with broadcast licensees as 
                                                   
190. Spitzer, supra note 76, at 1041. 
191. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73 (1998); see also id. at 
673 (“In the case of streets and parks, the open access and viewpoint neutrality commanded 
by the doctrine is ‘compatible with the intended purpose of the property.’ So too was the 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality compatible with the university’s funding of student 
publications in [Rosenberger]. In the case of television broadcasting, however, broad rights of 
access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that 
stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statu-
tory obligations.” (citation omitted)). 
192. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994). 
193. Id. at 1428–30. 
194. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1998). 
195. Id. at 675. 
196. Douglas C. Melcher, Free Air Time for Political Advertising: An Invasion of the Protected 
First Amendment Freedoms of Broadcasters, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 100, 119 (1998). 
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the relevant speakers. In fact, the Forbes Court notes that “the de-
bate was by design a forum for political speech by candidates,”197 
and that, applying forum analysis, the debate is classifiable as a 
“nonpublic forum, from which AETC could exclude Forbes in the 
reasonable, viewpoint neutral exercise of its journalistic discre-
tion.”198  
In addition, premising broadcast regulation on a public forum 
analysis instead of the traditional public trustee doctrine does not 
address the argument of some broadcasters that public ownership 
of the spectrum is a fallacy. CBS, for example, argues that “the 
electromagnetic spectrum is not a thing which can be owned. The 
spectrum exists only by virtue of electromagnetic radiation, which 
is produced by a radio transmitter sending energy through space, 
and can only be utilized through broadcasters’ investment of capi-
tal and initiative.”199  
Finally, although the proposal to justify broadcast regulation by 
means of the public forum doctrine may remedy some of the First 
Amendment concerns undermining public trusteeship, it does not 
do much to remedy the other political and economic impediments 
that have allowed broadcasters to exploit their public frequencies 
for enormous profit while giving little in return. It also does not 
remedy the structural incapability of the broadcasting spectrum 
itself to serve as a Madisonian free marketplace of ideas. Despite 
these and possibly other weaknesses, the public forum doctrine 
may be able to redeem the broadcast regulatory regime if its af-
firmative manifestation were broadly applied.200  
C. The Affirmative Public Forum Doctrine as Vehicle 
for Broadcast Regulatory Reform  
1. Past Proposals for Reform—The longstanding frustration with 
the ineffectiveness of the public trustee doctrine has generated in-
creasingly insistent demands that it be reformed to require 
commercial broadcasters to deliver quality, democracy-building 
programming and services to the American people commensurate 
                                                   
197. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. Mr. Melcher acknowledges that the Court reached this con-
clusion. Melcher, supra note 196, at 119 n.121. 
198. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676. 
199. Comments of CBS Corp. at v, In re Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad.  
Licensees, No. 99-360 (FCC Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ 
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6011155685. 
200. See infra Part III.C. 
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with the value conferred upon the broadcasters’ by the spectrum 
entrusted to them.201 These calls have grown especially numerous 
and insistent over the past decade as a result of the ensuing transi-
tion from analog to digital television. Proposed reforms have 
included demands for new requirements such as enforced public 
interest programming quotas. These reforms include increased 
public affairs, educational, and children’s television;202 free air time 
for political candidates;203 and the donation of datacasting204 ser-
vices to local educational and nonprofit institutions for the 
transmission of messages supporting civic participation and public 
education, health, and safety.205 
At the height of the negotiations on the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) and Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) demanded that commercial broadcasters be required to 
pay fair market value through an auction system for the new, lucra-
tive digital channels they would be assigned pursuant to the 
transition to digital television.206 The digital channels, which some 
commentators have appraised at being worth at least $12.5 billion 
(and as high as $365 billion), allow broadcasters to transmit high 
definition television and CD-quality sound over up to five  
“sub-channels” that also can accommodate pay-per-view services, 
                                                   
201. See Varona, supra note 20, at 89–94 (detailing various proposals for reform). 
202. See, e.g., Alliance for Better Campaigns et al., Public Interest Obligations 
Proposed Processing Guidelines (2004), available at http://www.newamerica.net/ 
Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_1588_1.pdf; see also Comments of the Alliance For Better 
Campaigns et al. at 3, In re Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, No. 99-360 
(FCC Jan. 26, 2000), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/dro/comments/99360/ 
5006314105.pdf (proposing a requirement for free time for political candidates on broad-
cast television); Comments of the Benton Foundation at 5–6, In re Pub. Interest Obligations 
of TV Broad. Licensees, No. 99-360 (FCC Jan 26, 2000), available at http:// 
ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/dro/comments/99360/5006314125.pdf (discussing lack of local public 
affairs programming and lack of quality local news).  
203. See, e.g., Media Access Project, Promoting Civil Discourse and Protecting 
Free Speech in Broadcast Media (2004), http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/ 
civicdisc.  
204. Television broadcasters’ new digital channels afford them the opportunity to 
transmit more than one “sub-channel” of high definition video and audio, as well as pure 
data, such as Internet pages, sports, weather and stock market information, advertising-
related and community affairs information. See In re Advanced Television Sys. & Their Im-
pact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820–21 (1997). 
205. See Advisory Comm. on Pub. Interest Obligations of Digital Television 
Broadcasters, supra note 2, at 3.  
206. See Varona, supra note 20, at 85 (citing Mundy, supra note 122, at 20 (quoting Sena-
tor John McCain) (“I want to see taxpayers get value from this resource, which the spectrum 
is. It’s not visible like most natural resources, like an oil resource, or public land, a gold 
mine you can see or touch. And I agree that there is certainly some legitimacy to the argu-
ment that broadcasters want to make this transition to [digital TV] and need time to change 
over. But to get this absolutely free[?] . . . No way.”)). 
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specialized data services, and other digital fare.207 Tellingly, Sena-
tors Dole’s and McCain’s passionate demands for broadcaster 
accountability ceased following the launch of Senator Dole’s presi-
dential campaign, which could not afford to antagonize the 
television media.208 A $9.5 million lobbying campaign against im-
posing any charge on broadcasters for new digital spectrum209 by 
the National Association of Broadcasters, which warned against a 
“tax on free television” that would threaten “your favorite shows,”210 
sounded the death knell for their calls at reform. 
Although the renewed demands for tangible and quantified 
public trustee requirements on broadcasters merit serious consid-
eration from the FCC and Congress, it is unlikely that these new 
demands would fare any better than the old. Demands for pre-
scribed quantities of certain types of programming, subject to 
Federal approval, face the same obstacles that rendered the FCC’s 
own attempts at definition and quantification of the public trustee 
standard symbolic at best, and meaningless at worst. The interre-
lated, irreconcilable contradictions upon which broadcasting 
regulation is precariously premised remain.211 
By contrast, the longstanding proposal of Henry Geller, former 
FCC General Counsel and National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration (NTIA) Administrator, to replace the 
public trustee model altogether with a spectrum fee to fund non-
commercial, educational television offers a much more promising 
solution. Geller has long proposed a spectrum usage fee of up to 
five percent on the gross advertising revenues of commercial televi-
sion licensees.212 Considering that the 2003 television station 
                                                   
207. See Ramesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza: How the Networks Plan to Make Even More 
from a $70 Billion Handout, Time, Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; see also Paul Fahri, Broadcast Executives 
Say Dole Vented Anger at Them, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1996, at F1; Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 
122, at 2561. 
208. See Mundy, supra note 122, at 20 (“Logic says that in an election, you don’t go tick-
ing off broadcasters if you can avoid it.”). 
209. See Arthur E. Rowse, A Lobby the Media Won’t Touch: How the Media Wields Its Power in 
Washington—and Gets Away with It, Wash. Monthly, May 1998, at 9. 
210. Id. 
211. These proposals do not do very much at all to resolve the First Amendment ten-
sions inherent in the FCC’s enabling legislation, the economic tensions in the commercial 
broadcasting industry that result in the commodification of viewers in the pursuit of the 
highest possible advertising revenue at the expense of public interest programming, the 
unparalleled political influence of the broadcasting industry in manipulating its overseers by 
electoral involvement as well as journalistic agenda-setting, and the fundamental unsuitabil-
ity of the broadcasting medium to serve as a true free marketplace of ideas that promotes 
democratic engagement and cultivates an informed and enlightened electorate. 
212. See Henry Geller, Geller to FCC: Scrap the Rules, Try a Spectrum Fee, Current, Oct. 30, 
2000, http://www.current.org/why/why020geller.html (observing that a one percent spec-
trum fee, which “would net roughly $250 million” and “go to public television solely for its 
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advertising revenue of only the top three broadcast networks CBS 
(Viacom), ABC (Disney), and NBC (General Electric) exceeded 
$18.8 billion, and the advertising revenue for local television sta-
tions approximated $24.2 billion, a five percent spectrum fee 
would generate at least $2 billion for taxpayers.213  
In Changing Channels, I note that although Mr. Geller’s spectrum 
tax proposal is laudable and deserves much more attention than it 
has received, its good intentions may be frustrated if the spectrum 
fee proceeds were directed only to fund public television.214 Among 
other concerns, a commercial-to-public television cross-subsidy may 
result in no net increase for public television stations, considering 
that Congress—in an age of massive budget deficits necessitating 
nearly universal spending cuts—simply may decide to reduce fed-
eral budget appropriations for the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting by the amount of the cross-subsidy paid by broadcast-
ers.215 In addition, although public television stations’ mission 
statements are aligned with the public interest purposes of the 
public trustee doctrine, public television, like commercial televi-
sion, remains a narrowly mediated medium affording few if any 
opportunities for true democratic deliberation. Moreover, the in-
creasing budgetary pressures on public broadcasters have rendered 
them increasingly beholden to commercial interests,216 and, as was 
                                                   
use in the educational field,” is consistent with an FCC mandate that broadcasters “serve the 
educational needs of children”); Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 
16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 341, 362–66 (1998) (proposing a three percent spectrum fee 
to supplement funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting).  
213. See Henry Geller & Tim Watts, New Am. Found., The Five Percent Solution: 
A Spectrum Fee to Replace the ‘Public Interest Obligations’ of Broadcasters 12–16 
(2002), available at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_844_1.pdf. 
214. See Varona, supra note 20, at 92–93. It is important to note, however, that although 
Mr. Geller originally directed his spectrum fee proposal to the subsidization of noncommer-
cial, educational television, more recent iterations of his proposal have allowed for greater 
flexibility in the use of the proceeds. For example, in 2002, Mr. Geller and Mr. Watts posited 
that the fee proceeds also could be directed to the purchase of free air time for political 
candidates, or for the funding of a “Digital Opportunity Investment Trust.” See Geller & 
Watts, supra note 213, at 12–13 (quoting Newton Minnow & Lawrence Grossman, Digi-
tal Promise (2001)). 
215. See Varona, supra note 20, at 92–93. 
216. See Nat Ives, On Public TV, Not Quite an Ad But Pretty Close, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2005, 
at C1; Press Release, Fairness & Accurancy in Reporting, The Commercialization of Chil-
dren’s Public Television (Mar. 15, 2000), available at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1925 
(showing evidence that for-profit companies are using on-air underwriting credits as lucra-
tive advertising conduits to reach affluent audiences); see also Don Aucoin, On a Wing and a 
Prayer: Are Big Bird’s Colleagues at PBS in Danger of Becoming Roadkill on the Information Super-
highway?, Boston Globe, Feb. 27, 2000, at E1 (discussing market and advertising pressures 
faced by PBS); Danny Schechter, Rejected by PBS (Again!): The Wail of the American Independent 
Filmmaker, Media Channel, May 19, 2001, http://www.mediachannel.org/views/dissector/ 
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always the case, the political whims of Congress and state govern-
ments.217  
Although Geller’s commercial-to-public television cross-subsidy 
idea raises some concerns, its central proposition—that commer-
cial broadcasters pay a tax for their use of the public spectrum—is 
of increasing appeal and viability. It is especially relevant at a time 
when other FCC telecommunications licensees have paid in excess 
of $23 billion for their use of public spectrum,218 while television 
licensees, cloaked as public trustees, are awarded their lucrative 
digital channels for free.  
2. Requiring Broadcasters to Subsidize Broadband Internet Access—
Instead of having commercial broadcasters subsidize public television, 
I have suggested as a friendly amendment to Mr. Geller’s proposal 
that commercial broadcasters subsidize access to broadband219 
Internet access to those Americans who presently cannot afford it 
or do not have access to it because it is not available in their com-
munities.220 Such a cross-subsidy would be consistent with 
longstanding universal service (e.g., “lifeline”) cross-subsidies in 
telephone service, and 1996 Telecom Act’s “E-Rate” program, 
which requires FCC telecommunications licensees (not broadcast-
ers) to subsidize deeply-discounted Internet access for elementary 
and high schools and libraries.221 Having broadcasters subsidize 
broadband Internet access also may be a means to help fund the 
efforts of hundreds of municipalities across the nation in providing 
                                                   
pbs.shtml (noting how PBS’s increasing dependence on advertising has rendered it more 
sensitive and responsive to political and corporate interests).  
217. See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson, Safe Harbor for Gay Bigotry, Boston Globe, Feb. 2, 2005 
at A15 (noting that the Public Broadcasting Service cancelled the national distribution of an 
episode of the children’s program “Postcards from Buster” featuring a visit to a Vermont 
farm incidentally owned by a family led by two women after receiving a letter from Secretary 
of Education Margaret Spellings complaining that “[m]any parents would not want their 
young children exposed to the lifestyles portrayed in this episode”); see also Paul Farhi, CPB 
Taps Two GOP Conservatives for Top Posts, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2005, at C2 (reporting that 
the Bush Administration had appointed conservative activists and Republican donors Cheryl 
F. Halpern and Gay Hart Gaines to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, with Halpern 
assuming the role of CPB Chairman, thereby “tightening conservative control over the 
agency that oversees National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service”). 
218. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
219. A “broadband” Internet connection, which currently can range from 2 to 6 mega-
bits per second (mbps), allows for the efficient transmission of one-way and interactive video 
and sound files, text, and other resources that cannot be accommodated in a “narrowband” 
connection, which has a maximum transmission speed of 56 kilobits per second (kbps). FCC 
Strategic Goals: Broadband, http://www.fcc.gov/broadband (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
220. See Varona, supra note 20, at 94–113.  
221. Id. at 106–11. The quasi-governmental Universal Service Administrative Company 
(USAC) administers the Universal Service Fund, which collects and distributes funds associ-
ated with all FCC cross-subsidies, including “LifeLine Assistance,” “Link-Up America,” and 
the E-Rate program. Id. at 107–09. 
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universal low-cost broadband Internet access by means of commu-
nity operated wireless (“Wi-Fi”) networks.222 
The United States ranks only eleventh in the world in 
broadband Internet penetration,223 with only 17.3 million high 
speed-Internet customers224 and 53% of the online population 
accessing the Internet via broadband connections.225 Moreover, the 
Project for Excellence in Journalism notes that the rate of increase 
for broadband penetration slowed in 2004 as compared to the 
previous year, with significant parts of the country still not wired 
for broadband access.226 
Although the “digital divide” between Whites and African-
Americans and other minorities in Internet access has somewhat 
narrowed over recent years,227 researchers have concluded that 
what remains is a marked disparity in access determined by house-
hold income and geographic location. The Pew Internet and 
American Life Project concluded that the still-high cost of personal 
computers and even narrowband Internet access228 has resulted in 
far lower Internet access rates for households with incomes under 
                                                   
222. See New Am. Found., Profiles of Municipal and Community Broadband Net-
works 4–16 (2005), available at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/ 
Doc_File_2245_1.pdf (profiling municipal Wi-Fi networks in Phila., Pa., Corpus Christi and 
Grandbury, Tex., Champaign-Urbana, Ill., and other communities); see also Chloe Albane-
sius, Multiple Firms Vie for San Francisco’s Wi-Fi Project, Nat’l Journal’s Tech. Daily, Oct. 17, 
2005, http://nationaljournal/com/members/search/ (search for article title; then follow 
hyperlink) (discussing San Francisco’s low-cost Wi-Fi plans); Gene Kprowski, Philadelphia Wi-
Fi Won’t End Debate, eWeek.com, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/article2/ 
0,1895,1867155,00.asp (discussing Philadelphia’s $15-to-$18 million installation contract 
with Earthlink Inc. for the deployment of a 135-square mile low-cost Wi-Fi zone). 
223. FCC, Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the 
United States: Fourth Report to Congress 41 (2004), available at http:// 
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-208A1.pdf. 
224. Press Release, National Cable and Telecommunications Association, New Interac-
tive Services Lead Cable’s 2004 Activity to Date (July 6, 2004), available at http:// 
www.ncta.com/press/press.cfm?PRid=512&showArticles=ok.  
225. Susannah Fox, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Digital Divs., at ii (2005), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Digital_Divisions_Oct_5_2005.pdf.  
226. The Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 
2005: An Annual Report on American Journalism: Online (2005), http:// 
www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/printable_online_economics.asp. 
227. See, e.g., Marry Madden, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, America’s Online 
Pursuits: The Changing Picture of Who’s Online and What They Do 5 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Pursuits_Final.PDF.  
228. Consumer Reports estimates the cost of the most inexpensive but reliable Internet-
ready personal computer at approximately $500. Ratings: Desktop Computers, Consumer Re-
ports, Dec. 2004, at 43. Monthly narrowband Internet subscriptions with major Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) cost approximately $20 per month, with most broadband connec-
tions costing approximately $35 per month. See generally Broadband Reports.com, http:// 
www.broadbandreports.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
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$50,000 as compared to wealthier households.229 The FCC itself 
echoed these findings in a study on broadband Internet accessibil-
ity it released on July 7, 2005.230  
The racial, geographic, and economic disparities in Internet ac-
cess are especially troubling in light of how the Internet in many 
ways has realized the hitherto unfulfilled purpose of broadcasting 
to provide America with a ubiquitous “free marketplace of ideas.” 
The Internet and its countless websites, discussion boards, web logs 
(more commonly known as blogs), chat rooms, entirely interactive 
“wiki” sites,231 and other interfaces have provided millions of indi-
vidual citizens with unprecedented opportunities for education, 
expression, discussion, and debate on an unlimited array of topics, 
including political, community, and social affairs.232 There also is 
no question that Internet activism and journalism, even in its rela-
tive youth, has had a transformative effect on our nation’s political 
life.233 For example, the story of President William J. Clinton’s affair 
with Monica Lewinsky, which led to his impeachment, was broken 
not by the major print or broadcast media but by Matt Drudge, the 
publisher of the web-based “Drudge Report.”234 Similarly, the initial 
success of Vermont Governor Howard Dean’s campaign for the 
2004 presidential nomination, which signed up 700,000 supporters 
and raised over $50 million via his campaign’s website alone, also is 
credited to the power of the web.235 In addition, web log publishers, 
                                                   
229. Amanda Lenhart, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, The Evershifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and the Digital Divide 5 
(2003), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=88 (“Independent 
of all other factors, having an income above $50,000 annually predicts internet use.”). 
230. News Release, FCC, High-Speed Connections to the Internet Increased 34% Dur-
ing 2004 for a Total of 38 Million Lines in Service 1–2 (July 7, 2005), available at  
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/hspd0705.pdf (finding that high population density and high medium 
income are the two most reliable predictors for broadband Internet access); see also James E. 
Prieger, The Supply Side of the Digital Divide: Is There Equal Availability in the Broadband Internet 
Access Market?, 41 Econ. Inquiry 346 (2003) (providing a more robust statistical analysis). 
231. “Wiki” sites, with “wiki” meaning “quick” or “fast” in Hawaiian, allow all visitors to 
edit the contents of the site and add new content at will, easily and quickly, without any fa-
miliarity with Internet coding language. See Dan Mitchell, A Blog that Blogs Corporate Blogs, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2006, at C5; Kushan Mitra, Quicki Wiki, Bus. Today, Apr. 24, 2005, at 128 
(characterizing the online wiki encyclopedia, Wikipedia.com, which is six times as big as the 
Encyclopedia Britannica in terms of number of entries, as “online democracy at work”). 
232. See generally Varona, supra note 20, at 97–106. 
233. Id. 
234. Kathy Kiely, Freewheeling ‘Bloggers’ Are Rewriting the Rules of Journalism, USA Today, 
Dec. 30, 2003, at 1A.  
235. Joan Vennochi, A Bridge to Dean Nation, Boston Globe, Feb. 24, 2004, at A19; see 
also Joe Trippi, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and 
the Overthrow of Everything 221–23 (2004) (detailing the Dean Campaign’s Internet 
organizing and fundraising strategies); Glen Justice, Bush Still Has More Cash, But Kerry Leads 
Web Race, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2004, at 18 (noting that approximately one-third of Democ-
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bloggers, often aim their attention at perceived mishandling of na-
tional news stories by the broadcast media. For example, it was 
conservative bloggers who brought national attention to problems 
with CBS News’s reporting of President George W. Bush’s National 
Guard service—problems that resulted in the early retirement of 
Dan Rather from his post as anchor of the CBS Evening News.236 As 
Professor Eugene Volokh, a blogger himself,237 puts it, “[b]logs can 
extend the legs of this kind of story” in that “[r]ather than having a 
life span of a few hours, a [blogged] story may end up breaking 
into the mass media.”238 
Political engagement aside, the Internet has proven to be an 
important tool for educational and professional advancement. A 
2001 study by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
revealed that increased Internet and computer access by students 
studying at the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade levels resulted in 
higher test scores, with home Internet access correlating with 
higher overall academic performance.239 Familiarity with and access 
to the Internet also is becoming a prerequisite for many employ-
ment opportunities in this country, even for job seekers in the 
poorest areas. For example, in 2002, the state of Alabama was criti-
cized for mounting billboard advertisements for a state-run, 
“regional[,] virtual one-stop” employment center, which promised 
job postings, training, and assistance in one of the state’s poorest 
regions using only an Internet website address (URL) as the con-
tact information.240  
                                                   
ratic Presidential Nominee John Kerry’s campaign contributions were raised through his 
website).  
236. See John Samples, Reid This, Nat’l Rev., Nov. 16, 2005, http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/comment/samples200511160846.asp; see also David Kline & Dan 
Burstein, Blog!: How the Newest Media Revolution is Changing Politics, Business, 
and Culture 21 (Arne J. De Keijzer & Paul Berger eds., 2005); Michael Messing, The End of 
News?, N.Y. Rev., Dec. 1, 2005, at 23. 
237. See The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
238. See Sam Singer, Nominee Roberts Faces Trial by Blog, Chi. Tribune, Aug. 6, 2005, at C8 
(noting the effects of web log activism, or “blogosphere,” on the federal judicial confirma-
tion battles). 
239. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Assessment of 
Educ. Progress: 2000 Sci. (2001), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ 
science/results/internetuse.asp. 
240. Anthony G. Wilhelm, Digital Nation: Toward an Inclusive Information So-
ciety 73 (2004) (citing Patricia Dedrick, State Promotes Jobs Web Site Where Few People Use 
Computers, Birmingham News (Ala.), Nov. 29, 2002). 
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The Internet also has provided otherwise isolated individuals the 
ability to connect and build virtual communities on the Internet.241 
For example, the Internet has provided heretofore unavailable 
communication and community-building resources for gay men 
and lesbians living in remote or hostile environments,242 and  
provides important virtual gathering places for other isolated mi-
norities.243  
Having commercial broadcasters satisfy their public trusteeship 
obligations by helping subsidize broadband Internet access also 
would circumvent the various paradoxes and obstacles blocking 
previous reform initiatives. It does not impinge upon the broad-
casters’ First Amendment rights, does not rely directly on the 
scarcity rationale, and would help counterbalance the broadcasters’ 
political and agenda-setting power by providing wider access to the 
Internet’s centers of political and social activism. A broadcast-to-
Internet cross-subsidy also would be more politically viable than 
reform ideas dependent on content regulation, insofar as broad-
casters, whose content is now fully digital and therefore compatible 
with Internet platforms, have burgeoning presences on the Inter-
net and a commercial self-interest in increasing access to those 
offerings.244 
3. The Internet as Public Forum—A number of scholars have pos-
ited that the Internet has many of the characteristics of a public 
                                                   
241. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L.J. 1743, 1745–46 (1995) 
(“What will be new are the communities that this space will allow, and the . . . possibilities 
that these communities will bring.”). 
242. Note, Communities Virtual and Real: Social and Political Dynamics of Law in Cyberspace, 
112 Harv. L. Rev. 1586, 1592–94 (1999) (describing gay and lesbian websites such as “The 
WELL” and “LambdaMoo” as “vivid examples of the capability of online groups to facilitate 
sustained and meaningful interaction among members”); see also Edward Stein, Queers 
Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 159, 162 
(2003) (describing how the Internet has provided isolated gay men and lesbians in other-
wise hostile environments “a virtual community that constitutes an emotional lifeline”). 
243. See, e.g., Black America Web, http://www.blackamericaweb.com (last visited Feb. 
13, 2006) (providing news and information and discussion spaces for African-Americans); 
Deaf Nation, http://www.deafnation.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (serving the deaf com-
munity); National Black Deaf Advocates, http://nbda.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) 
(serving as a gathering point for deaf African-Americans). 
244. See Richard Sandomir, CBS to Acquire CSTV for $325 Million in Stock, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
4, 2005, at C3 (detailing CBS’s purchase of CSTV Networks, an amalgamation of 120 sports-
oriented web sites and a cable network, to complement its main Internet sports site CBS 
Sportline.com, which combined with the CSTV web sites had 14.4 million unique hits in 
September 2004); see also Gail Schiller, Nets Promotional Priority Based on Playing Favorites, 
Hollywood Rep., Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/search/ 
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001096375 (reporting intensified efforts by the major 
commercial broadcast networks in expanding their Internet presences for purposes of cross-
marketing programming and advertising).  
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forum.245 This argument became especially compelling following 
the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Reno v. ACLU, in which it 
struck down as violations of the First Amendment the “indecent 
transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996.246 In so doing, the Court 
characterized the Internet’s components—the World Wide Web, 
discussion groups, E-mail, etc.—as “constitut[ing] a unique me-
dium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular 
location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access 
to the Internet.”247  
The Court acknowledged that the progenitor of the Internet was 
a U.S. Department of Defense program named ARPANET, which 
connected military computers with those at universities and de-
fense contractors to facilitate collaboration and communication.248 
It also noted that “from the readers’ viewpoint,” the Internet (and 
specifically the World Wide Web) is “comparable . . . to both a vast 
library including millions of readily available and indexed publica-
tions and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.”249 From a 
speaker’s perspective, “it constitutes a vast platform from which to 
address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of read-
ers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization 
with a computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ informa-
tion.”250 Although the Court did not explicitly apply First 
Amendment public forum analysis to the Internet, its language 
strongly suggests that the Court regarded it as one.251 
Although there is no question that the Internet provides the gen-
eral public with a plethora of fora in which to speak, read, and 
listen, there remains debate about whether First Amendment public 
forum analysis applies to the Internet. The threshold inquiry, and 
biggest potential obstacle, is whether the Internet truly is “public.” 
Much of the Internet’s infrastructure remains under Federal, and 
therefore public, control. The United States government controls 
each fundamental element of the Internet’s infrastructure, includ-
ing the Domain Name System, which assigns numeric Internet 
                                                   
245. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 166, at 1611 (“It does not require much creativity to char-
acterize the Internet as a public forum . . . .”). 
246. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
247. Id. at 851. 
248. Id. at 849–50. 
249. Id. at 853. 
250. Id. 
251. See Gey, supra note 166, at 1611 (“[I]t is not unreasonable to suggest that the Reno 
majority opinion . . . treats the Internet as a public forum without actually making the des-
ignation explicit.”). 
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Protocol (IP) addresses to domain names (such as 
http://www.wcl.american.edu) through the U.S.-based Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).252 The 
Federal government’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
developed and administers file exchange IPs, and the United States 
continues to fund and host a significant portion of the Internet 
“backbone,” the matrix of computers at the Internet’s core that 
keeps it connected and running.253  
The Internet’s infrastructure, however publicly owned it may be, 
does not serve as the platform for a single forum, but for the 
countless array of fora currently on the World Wide Web in the 
form of websites, discussion boards, blogs, chat rooms, and other 
interfaces. Although some of those fora are government-
controlled—such as discussion boards hosted by public universities 
and municipalities—the great majority of the fora on the Web are 
controlled by private entities eligible for the full complement of 
First Amendment protections afforded to private speakers, includ-
ing the right to silence or censor the speech of guests.254 In fact, 
Professor Dawn Nunziato argues that “the vast majority of speech 
on the Internet today occurs within private places and spaces that 
are owned and regulated by private entities . . . who are not subject 
to the First Amendment’s protections for free speech.”255 She 
warns, correctly, that “[w]hile it is often presumed that speech on 
the Internet will be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ the pri-
vate entities that own and control the forums for Internet speech 
enjoy and often exercise the unfettered power to impose substan-
tial restrictions on such speech.”256 
                                                   
252. Jonathan Bick, The Internet as Government Action, N.J. L.J., Oct. 3, 2005, available at 
http://www.bicklaw.com/Publications/TheInternetasGovernmentAction.htm; see also Brad-
ley S. Klapper, U.S. Insists on Keeping Control of the Web, BusinessWeek Online, Sept. 29, 2005, 
at 1 (“We will not agree to the U.N. taking over the management of the Internet.” (quoting 
U.S. Ambassador David)). 
253. See Bick, supra note 252. 
254. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 1115, 1115–29 (2005). 
255. Id. at 1116–17 (noting that a very large proportion of Internet speech occurs on 
sites controlled by private “Internet service providers (ISPs) like America Online (AOL) and 
Yahoo!, content providers like washingtonpost.com and nytimes.com, and pipeline provid-
ers like Comcast and Verizon,” in addition to the web spaces provided by private employers 
and universities).  
256. Id. at 1121 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (discussing a 
number of striking examples of private Internet forum hosts who enforce highly restrictive 
speech policies, including AOL’s Terms of Service, which gives AOL “sole discretion to re-
move any content that . . . [is] objectionable, or inaccurate” and that includes “vulgar 
language,” which is “no more appropriate online than [it] would be at Thanksgiving din-
ner”); see also id. at 1122 (citing Found. for Individual Rights in Educ., FIRE’s Spotlight: The 
Campus Freedom Resource, http://www.speechcodes.org/schools.php (last visited Feb. 13, 
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To address this concern about the increasing privatization of 
Internet fora, and resulting reduction of truly public online spaces, 
proceeds from any broadcaster-to-Internet cross-subsidy, in addi-
tion to subsidizing access to the Internet, should subsidize the 
creation of government-mediated fora. These public Internet fora, 
like their “brick-and-mortar” counterparts, would be subject to the 
strictest First Amendment scrutiny as designated unlimited public 
fora.257 Municipal Wi-Fi, an idea proposed by former president of 
NBC News and PBS, Lawrence K. Grossman, and former FCC 
Chairman, Newton N. Minow, contemplates such subsidy-eligible 
online public fora. Grossman and Minow proposed the creation of 
a “Digital Opportunity Investment Trust” (DOIT) that would de-
velop a public Internet presence to “encourage an informed 
citizenry and self-government,” and “make available to all Ameri-
cans the best of the nation’s arts, humanities, and culture; and 
teach the skills and disciplines needed in this information-based 
economy.”258  
Requiring broadcasters to subsidize broadband Internet access 
and the creation and maintenance of truly public fora on the Web 
would be consistent with the new interpretations of an affirmative, 
collectivist freedom of speech. For example, Professor Owen Fiss 
criticizes the notion that the core purpose of the freedom of 
speech is to protect the autonomy of individuals.259 Fiss argues that 
such autonomy is merely a means to the true goal of the First 
Amendment: the cultivation of vibrant public deliberation neces-
sary for informed self-governance.260 He writes that “[a]utonomy is 
protected not because of its intrinsic value . . . but rather as a 
                                                   
2006)) (discussing examples of restrictive Internet speech codes in private college and uni-
versity web services, including that of Colby College, which forbids Internet speech that may 
result in “a loss of self-esteem” in the individual to which the speech is directed, and that of 
Brown University, which restricts speech that may create “feelings of impotence, anger, or 
disenfranchisement,” regardless of intent). 
257. Such public Internet spaces would not qualify as traditional public fora because, as 
creations of a nascent technology, they “by long tradition or by government fiat have [not] 
been devoted to assembly and debate.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). However, they likely would be classified as unlimited designated 
public fora, to which the same First Amendment strict scrutiny as speech restrictions in tra-
ditional fora would apply. Id. 
258. Newton Minow & Lawrence Grossman, A Digital Gift to the Nation: Ful-
filling the Promise of the Digital and Information Age 5 (2001). See generally The 
Digital Promise Project, Creating the Digital Opportunity Investment Trust: A 
Proposal to Transform Learning and Training for the 21st Century (2003), available 
at http://www.digitalpromise.org/about/report_to_congress/. 
259. Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided 13 (1996). 
260. Id. at 13–17. 
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means or instrument of collective self-determination. We allow 
people to speak so others can vote.”261  
Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin argues that the objective of free-
dom of speech is “to promote democratic culture,” which is more 
than mere representative institutions and public debate, but in-
stead is “a culture in which individuals have a fair opportunity to 
participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 
individuals.”262 It “is about individual liberty as well as collective  
self-governance; it is about each individual’s ability to participate in 
the production and distribution of culture.”263 He argues that 
“[f]reedom of speech means giving everyone . . . the chance to use 
technology to participate in their culture” by having the ability “to 
interact, to create, to build, to route around and glom on, to take 
from the old and produce the new, and to talk about whatever they 
want to talk about, whether it be politics, public issues, or popular 
culture.”264 Professor Sunstein generally agrees with Balkin and Fiss, 
calling for a “New Deal for speech” that would require the gov-
ernment to seek ways to realize the Madisonian conceptualization 
of the First Amendment by informing democratic decisionmaking 
with vibrant public deliberation reflecting a diversity of viewpoints 
and speakers.265  
4. Cautionary Notes on the Online Marketplace of Ideas—Although 
the Internet hosts much more of a “marketplace of ideas” than the 
broadcast spectrum ever could muster, it is by no means a panacea 
for all that ails American democracy and culture. To the contrary, 
the Internet harbors dangers of its own. The Internet’s ubiquity, 
vastness, and anonymity make it a vital forum for both democracy 
and crime. For example, it has been used by terrorists to radicalize 
and recruit the disaffected and organize attacks,266 and by sex of-
fenders to seduce their victims.267  
                                                   
261. Id. at 13. 
262. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004). 
263. Id. at 3–4. 
264. Id. at 45. 
265. Sunstein, supra note 95, at xvi–xxx, 17. 
266. Ronald Marks, Homeland Security’s Biggest Challenge: Too Much Information, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 21, 2005, at 9 (“Terrorists print their plans on the Internet in tens 
of thousands of blogs and chat rooms.”); see also Al Qaeda and the Internet, Washington-
post.com, Aug. 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12602578 (Westlaw) (transcript of online 
discussion with international terrorism consultant Evan Kohlmann, detailing the sophisti-
cated use of the Internet by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations).  
267. See generally Christa M. Book, Do You Really Know Who Is on the Other Side of Your Com-
puter Screen? Stopping Internet Crimes Against Children, 14 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 749 (2004); 
Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 
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Moreover, the Internet’s effects on democracy are in question. 
Professor Owen Fiss warns against overestimating the democratic 
value of the Internet, considering that “[t]he Internet provides 
vastly more information than television, but does so only if citizens 
actively seek that information out.”268 Professor Sunstein makes the 
related note that the Internet can polarize and fragment the public 
sphere.269 Whereas editorial controls inherent in broadcasting and 
print media typically filter out extremist viewpoints in favor of a 
mediated and moderated sampling of content from a number of 
areas that audience members may not have sought out themselves, 
the Internet as a whole lacks that mediating and moderating func-
tion. A person predisposed to anti-Semitism, for example, may opt 
to restrict her Internet surfing to anti-Semitic and similar hate sites, 
thereby only receiving content that reaffirms her bias. Similarly, an 
immigrant who may not be prejudiced but has an interest only in 
Internet content from his native nation may eschew all other Inter-
net fare for websites from his homeland and in his native tongue. 
Professor Sunstein worries that although “[u]nplanned, unantici-
pated encounters are central to democracy itself,” the Internet 
enables users to bypass many if not all of those enlightening and 
broadening encounters in favor of only likeminded individuals and 
content.270 His concern reflects the view of John Stuart Mill, who 
warned that:  
It is hardly possible to overrate the value . . . of placing human 
beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and 
with modes of thought and action unlike those with which 
they are familiar. . . . Such communication has always been, 
and is peculiarly in the present age, one of the primary 
sources of progress.271 
Another concern involving the viability of the Internet as a true 
marketplace of ideas involves the question of audience adequacy. 
                                                   
U. Rich. L. Rev. 477 (2004) (analyzing the legality of sting operations to arrest Internet 
child sex predators).  
268. Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1215, 1216 (1999) 
(“Television informs even the passive viewer.”). 
269. Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 8–9, 236 (2001) (observing that the Internet en-
ables users to create their own “Neighborhood Me,” in which all of the information they 
receive and all of the people they associate with online agree with one viewpoint, however 
narrow and isolating it may be). 
270. Id. at 8. 
271. John Stuart Mill, 3 Principles of Political Economy, at ch. XVII ¶ 17.14 (Wil-
liam J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1909) (1848), available at http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Mill/mlP1.html. 
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In contrasting the Internet with broadcasting, Professor Jack M. 
Balkin notes that the emergence of digital communications cre-
ated a different kind of scarcity: “It is not the scarcity of bandwidth 
but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, scarcity of audi-
ence attention.”272 With such an unlimited array of fora on the 
Internet, audiences can be atomized, with significant concentra-
tions of viewers hard to achieve.273  
Professor Walter Effross advises caution in having the govern-
ment affirmatively create public spaces for political speech on the 
Internet. He notes that “among the most remarkable aspects of the 
World Wide Web are its democracy and decentralization: anyone 
with access to the technology can contribute to a Usenet news-
group, or put up a Web site on, almost any topic.”274 Segregating 
political speech to certain public areas of the Internet therefore 
would be unnecessary and counterproductive insofar as it “would 
conflict with the medium’s essential virtues.”275 
Despite its dangers to physical safety and democracy itself, the 
Internet’s benefits as a tool for democratic and cultural engage-
ment outweigh its shortcomings. The Internet cannot be expected 
to be any safer and more effective as a marketplace of ideas than 
the brick-and-mortar gathering places that it has supplemented, 
and in many cases, replaced. As in any marketplace, Internet “con-
sumers” are wise to heed the warning of caveat emptor. 
Coupled with the subsidization of broadband access for under-
served communities, the use of Broadcast-to-Internet cross-subsidy 
proceeds to fund the creation and maintenance of truly public fora 
on the web would help realize the Internet’s fullest potential as an 
important democratic resource. Such a cross-subsidy also would 
enable broadcasters to pay their due by helping the Internet real-
ize the free marketplace of ideas that proved unattainable in the 
broadcasting spectrum. 
                                                   
272. Balkin, supra note 262, at 7. 
273. Professor Ellen P. Goodman correctly notes that “[t]oday, the scarce resource is at-
tention, not programming.” Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content 
Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1389, 
1390 (2004).  
274. Walter A. Effross, Dir. of the Program on Counseling Elec. Commerce Entrepre-
neurs at Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Testimony Before the Democracy Online Project: 
Fencing Off Cyberspace—and Fending Off Democracy? (May 22, 2000), available at http:// 
www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/effross/democracyonline.cfm. 
275. Id. Professor Effross principally addressed the proposal to segregate political sites 
under the “.pol” domain. Id. He opposed the proposal on a number of grounds in addition 
to the decentralization of political speech on the Internet, including the definitional diffi-
culties inherent in classifying sites as political or non-political, administrative and 
enforcement challenges, and problems with security against hackers. Id.  
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Although the challenge of audience scarcity applies to the 
Internet, it also is a real challenge in brick-and-mortar town 
squares, where attracting audiences for speech is not an easy task. 
Whereas the brick-and-mortar town squares offer citizens the op-
portunity to have the “unplanned, unanticipated encounters” that 
Professor Sunstein rightly deems “central to democracy itself,”276 
the Internet’s viral and integrated nature enables similar encoun-
ters as well as the rapid acquisition of massive audiences. For 
example, in the months preceding the 2004 presidential election, 
some of the more popular bloggers whose sites allow readers to 
post messages of their own boasted enormous increases in 
audiences.277 
IV. Conclusion 
Although the beleaguered public trustee doctrine continues to 
serve as the justification for broadcast regulation, and specifically 
the limitations on the free speech rights of broadcast licensees, a 
broadened interpretation of the First Amendment public forum 
doctrine is a viable and potentially better alternative to the trustee-
ship model. It enables the government to impose reasonable 
regulations on the speech of broadcasters without relying on the 
scarcity rationale or other justifications associated with the public 
trustee doctrine that, although still valid, draw increasing criticism 
for being obsolete or outmoded.  
An affirmative interpretation of the public forum doctrine—
pursuant to which the government actively creates and maintains 
public fora for citizens’ speech—contributed to the creation of the 
broadcast public trustee model, whose fundamental objective was 
the creation on the nation’s airwaves of “an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”278 The 
broadcast spectrum was intended to serve as a central point of 
community focus for, in the words of Hague v. CIO, “communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens” and “discussing public questions.”279 
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After seven decades of failure by the public trustee doctrine to 
deliver a free marketplace of ideas on the broadcast spectrum, it is 
clear that the Internet is a much more viable electronic medium 
for hosting such a marketplace. As concluded by the trial court in 
ACLU v. Reno, “[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that the Inter-
net has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory 
marketplace of mass speech that this country—and indeed the 
world—has yet seen.”280 Yet broadband access to the Internet, 
which exposes users to otherwise inaccessible video, audio pro-
grams, and interactivity, remains too expensive or unavailable to 
many communities who are poor or live in underserved or un-
served areas.  
Because the Internet has become such a powerful resource for 
public speech, education, and democratic enfranchisement, an 
affirmative application of the public forum doctrine compels the 
government to make it easier for all speakers to access the Inter-
net, and once there, visit virtual places where the full complement 
of First Amendment protections adhere. Broadcasters should be 
required to help provide access to such Internet public fora. After 
decades of profiting significantly from the constructive subsidy of 
unenforced public trusteeship, while commoditizing viewers and 
listeners on the public’s own airwaves, broadcast licensees should 
have to earn the right to retain their FCC licenses by helping sub-
sidize access to the Internet—the electronic medium that has 
realized the “free marketplace of ideas” that broadcasting prom-
ised but never delivered. 
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